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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the greatest achievements of the European Union (EU) is the abolition 
of internal borders and the establishment of the right to free movement. 
Consequently, the EU has made an effort managing its common external borders 
by establishing several internal mechanisms, instruments and bodies as well as 
various forms of cooperation with the associated Schengen countries and external 
third actors. Considering the various means of the EU’s border policy, the 
question arises how these different efforts are coordinated. As for the EU’s border 
management to be effective it has to take place at different levels. Hence, this 
study’s analysis is guided by an altered version of the four-tier access control 
model developed in the EU Schengen Catalogue. Thereby, the focus lies on the 
different efforts undertaken by the EU as well as on the coordination in the 
horizontal and the vertical dimension of border management. As result, this thesis 
suggests that the mode of coordination depends on the respective stakeholders 
involved and the EU’s relationship towards these actors and therefore varies 
across the different levels of border management. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The external borders of the EU play a key role in defining and  
protecting the area of freedom, security and justice that we all desire. 
 The control and surveillance of borders contribute to managing flows 
 of persons entering and leaving that area and help protect our 
 citizens from threats to their security.”1 
 
One of the greatest achievements of the European Union (EU) is the 
abolition of internal borders and the establishment of the right to free movement 
guaranteed to EU citizens by treaty. Nowadays, the Schengen area comprises 
almost 44,000 km of external sea borders and 9,000 km of land borders, granting 
nearly half a billion inhabitants the right of internal free movement (Frontex 
2014a). However “most threats to the internal security of the EU either originate 
outside Europe or have a clear nexus to other parts of the world” (Council 2010b: 
3). Considering that the problems of irregular migration and crime are not subject 
to geographical restrictions, external border control is crucial for the EU’s internal 
security. Thus, with the abolition of internal border checks the EU saw an 
increasing need to strengthen the management of its ‘external frontiers’, meaning 
the combined territory of the EU Member States (MS).  
An effective border management is considered inevitable for stability, 
security as well as for economic growth. Hence, a strong management of the 
external frontiers helps reducing and fighting the cross-border movement of 
crime, terrorism and irregular migration. At the same time, it facilitates trade and 
legal movement of people. Therefore, using the words of Marenin (2006: 11) 
“borders must be both open and closed, be both gates and walls”. These different 
functions already point towards the multi-functionality and complexity of border 
management. 
Thus, notwithstanding that the responsibility for borders remains primarily 
with its MS, the EU developed several mechanisms and policies internally, but 
also in cooperation with the associated Schengen countries. Additionally, the EU 
signed various agreements with third parties and initiated different projects for 
securing its external frontiers. In this regard, the European Commission
2
 (2007: 
13) stressed the importance of coordination and cooperation in border control “to 
reach the common goal of open, but controlled and secure borders”. Considering 
the various means of the EU’s border management, the question arises how these 
different efforts are coordinated.  
                                                          
1
 Council 2002b: 3 
2
 Hereafter: The Commission 
 5 
 
Reviewing official documents and secondary literature, it is arguable that in 
order for the EU’s border management to be effective it has to take place at 
different levels ranging from the member state level, over common European 
action to the involvement of the associated Schengen countries and third actors 
outside the EU. Nonetheless, most of the border management literature deals with 
separate single elements of the EU’s border policies like asylum and migration 
issues (e.g. Geddes 2005), Frontex (e.g. Carrera 2007), the Schengen area (e.g. 
Monar 2006) or the European approach to individual countries (e.g. Kirisci 2007). 
Another frequently covered topic is the accountability of the EU’s border 
management. So far only little scholarly work was conducted, however, 
investigating into the broader picture of European border management and the 
coordination of its different levels. Berg and Ehin (2006) are two of the few 
scholars who examine more than one policy area in their study, but still do not 
scrutinize their interconnection. As hardly any scholar has investigated more 
thoroughly into the different levels of the EU’s external border policy and the 
coordination, with this thesis a contribution to this matter is intended. Thus, the 
following twofold question shall guide the subsequent study: 
 
What are the different efforts undertaken by the EU to manage the European 
external borders, and how are these efforts of border management coordinated? 
 
Since coordination is generally difficult to be achieved by any policy system 
(Schout & Jordan 2008: 11), coordinating the EU’s external border regime can be 
considered even more intricate due to its characterization as a so-called ‘high 
politics’ field by intruding the states’ sovereignty. In this context, Chisholm 
(1989: 13) considers coordination as an attempt “to bring about some kind of 
order”. Over the years, the EU developed an Integrated Border Management 
(IBM) strategy stressing the importance of cooperation and a smooth interplay of 
national measures, joint EU action and cooperation with the Schengen associated 
members and third countries. The establishment of the four-tier access control 
model for border management by the EU Schengen Catalogue can be regarded an 
attempt to ‘bring some kind of order’ into the European efforts of border control. 
This model is altered slightly to fit the needs of this paper and used as a 
framework to scrutinize the various European means to control the common 
external borders. 
Referring to Malone and Crowston (1990: 361) coordination is “the act of 
managing interdependencies”. In this regard, it is arguable that the way 
cooperation occurs reflects the particular mode of coordination. Consequently, the 
following analysis aims at identifying and examining the nature of these 
interdependencies and how are they managed by the EU, or in other words how 
they are coordinated. Hence, by determining the stakeholders’ relationship, the 
particular mode of coordination can be identified.  
According to the multilevel governance approach by Hooghe and Marks, 
which describes policy coordination across multiple levels, interaction among 
actors occurs in two ways: in a vertical dimension across the different levels of 
governance and in a horizontal dimension between relevant actors within the same 
level (Hooghe & Marks 2001: 1-4). Considering the EU’s four-tier access control 
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model, these two dimensions seem also to be present in border management. 
Thus, this study investigates the coordination of the multiple stakeholders and 
mechanisms in the horizontal dimension (the interaction between the EU and the 
respective actor in the particular level) and in the vertical dimension between the 
different levels of border management. 
In order to cover these two dimensions of coordination in European border 
management, the initial research question is divided into two sub questions that 
guide the later analysis: 
 
Horizontal dimension: What are the different efforts undertaken by the EU 
to manage its external borders and how does the cooperation and coordination 
with the respective actor(s) look like? 
 
Vertical dimension: How are the different levels of border management 
interconnected and coordinated?  
 
The following thesis’ aim is twofold: first, the different efforts undertaken 
collectively by the EU to manage the external borders within the different levels 
are examined. Thereby, the focus is not solely on migration and asylum as many 
scholars previously did, but on the concept of border management as an approach 
to fight cross-border crime in general. The second more theoretical purpose is to 
contribute to the existing research by investigating into the coordination of the 
IBM levels. However, as this thesis focuses on the analysis of the existing 
structure of the EU’s efforts in protecting its external borders objectively, it does 
not discuss the moral and ethical criticism of the EU’s measures of border control 
which is often raised by NGOs and public media. Neither does it assess the 
effectiveness of the EU’s IBM. 
For reasons of overview, this chapter ends with an outline of the study. 
After this introduction, Chapter 2 leads into the concept of border management by 
offering definitions of the most important terms. Next to the discussion of IBM, a 
brief outline of the legislative development of the EU’s border policies is given. 
Following this, Chapter 3 provides the theoretical background as a basis for the 
later analysis by determining the concepts of coordination and cooperation, before 
the methodology chapter (Chapter 4) describes the methodological approach and 
research design of this study. Chapter 5 entails the actual analysis of the EU’s 
efforts in border management by subsequently investigating into the different 
levels of the adjusted four-level-model of border management (horizontal 
dimension, Chapter 5.1) and their interconnection (vertical dimension, Chapter 
5.2). Chapter 5.3 merges and theorizes the findings of both dimensions. Finally, 
the paper concludes (Chapter 6) by answering the main research question as well 
as assessing the outcome and limits of the study. 
  
 7 
 
2 Border management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As aforementioned, this thesis aims to examine the EU’s efforts in border 
management. In this regard, the following questions may arise: ‘What are 
borders, border control and management?’ and ‘How does the EU approach its 
border management?’. This chapter thus focusses on providing the necessary 
background knowledge to examine the EU’s efforts to manage its external 
frontiers. The particular concepts are defined in a first step, before the European 
approach of external border management and its development are outlined in a 
second. 
 
 
2.1 The concept of borders, border control and border 
management  
 
 
Over decades, the perception of what constitutes a border has changed. 
According to Berg and Ehin (2006: 66) the conceptual category of external 
borders is extremely diverse and fragmented. Although there is no definition 
agreed-upon of what constitutes border security by scholars, the importance of 
controlling the external borders is uncontested, as it constitutes a key priority of 
states. Geddes (2005) distinguishes between three types of borders: territorial, 
organizational and conceptual. Territorial borders are understood as the classical 
land, sea and air ports of entry “at which the sovereign powers of the state to 
exclude are exercised” (Geddes 2005: 789). The second type of borders, 
organizational borders, are said to consist of the membership conditions for 
migrants leading to the access to the welfare state, labour market and the national 
citizenship. Lastly, conceptual borders comprise notions of community and 
identity (Geddes 2005: 788-790). The following thesis is based on the first 
conception of territorial borders. In this regard, the EU refers to external borders 
as “the Member States’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders 
and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not 
internal borders” (EU 2006: Article 2(2)).  
Controlling the frontiers is considered an integral part of high politics that 
impinges directly on state sovereignty (Geddes 2012: 266). Therefore, an effective 
border management is indispensable. In general, border management describes 
the act of managing the respective border control measures and the administration 
of borders. Hills (2011: 33) points out that the precise meaning of border 
management varies according to the national context. However, it usually 
concerns the legislative framework, approaches and procedures to regulate 
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activities as well as traffic across borders.
3
 As this thesis scrutinizes the European 
efforts of external border management, a definition of border control coined by 
the EU is used in the subsequent analysis. Consequently, border control is defined 
as “activities carried out at a border, in response exclusively to an intention to 
cross a border, and consisting of border checks and border surveillance” (EU 
2010a). Thereby, the definition is composed of two integral elements of border 
management which are the systematic check of all persons crossing the external 
frontiers and the ensurance of effective border surveillance between border 
crossing points (Council 2002a: 10; Council 2009: 14).  
Referring to Anderson (2000: 15) border controls are part of so-called 
‘frontier regimes’. These regimes “consist of agreements about borders […]; the 
practices that have grown up around them; the administration and management of 
borders controls; related systems of police and customs cooperation; and 
institutions and arrangements for transfrontier cooperation” (Anderson 2000: 15). 
The frontier regime of IBM established by the EU is subject to scrutiny in the 
following thesis. But what does European IBM imply? 
 
 
2.2 Integrated Border Management (IBM) 
 
 
According to the Council of the European Union
4
 (2009: 8) “an overall 
model for European border management is an important tool for safeguarding 
internal security of the Member States and, in particular, to prevent and reveal 
illegal immigration and related crime as well as other cross-border crime”. Thus, 
effective border management is not only inevitable for those countries at whose 
frontiers border control is carried out, but for all MS that participate in the area of 
free movement and have abolished their internal borders (principle of solidarity) 
(Council 2009: 8). Reviewing the respective literature, different approaches are 
suggested to tackle the issue of managing the external borders. One approach is 
the concept of IBM with a particular emphasis on security issues.  
Referring to Marenin (2010: 17) IBM has diverse meanings both in 
literature and in practice. As this thesis investigates the EU’s efforts of border 
management, the European IBM perception will be used. The EU’s concept of 
IBM was first mentioned by the Commission in the 2002-2006 planning 
programme for the Western Balkans, followed by the ‘four-tier access control 
model’ stated in the Schengen Catalogue in 2002. In order to effectively manage 
                                                          
3
 In more detail, the EU determines management of external borders as “the activities carried out 
by public authorities of the Member States in order: (a) to carry out checks and surveillance at 
external borders provided for by articles 5 and 6 of the Schengen Convention; (b) To gather, 
analyse and exchange any specific intelligence or general information enabling the border guard to 
analyse the risk that a person, object or asset constitutes for the internal security of the common 
area of freedom of movement, law and order or the national security of the Member States, and for 
general compliance with Community legislation; (c) To analyse the development of the threats 
likely to affect the security of the external borders and to set the priorities for action by border 
guards accordingly; (d) To anticipate the needs as regards staff and equipment to ensure security at 
external borders” (Commission 2007a: 10). 
4
 Hereafter: The Council 
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its borders, the EU developed a more general IBM strategy over the years. 
Therefore, a respective European IBM concept, based on the aforementioned 
general definition of border management, was adopted by the JHA Council in 
2006. The Commission (2007: 13) defined IBM as “the coordination and 
cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border 
security and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient and integrated border 
management systems, in order to reach the common goal of open, but controlled 
and secure borders”. Accordingly, as the concepts of coordination and cooperation 
constitute integral parts of IBM, they are discussed more in detail in Chapter 3.  
The EU’s IBM strategy consists of the following aspects: border control 
(checks and surveillance), investigation of cross border crime in coordination with 
the respective law enforcement authorities, the four-tier access control model
5
, 
interagency and international cooperation, coordination and coherence of 
institutions and MS’ activities (Council 2006: 4). Furthermore, the EU defined 
several objectives to be achieved through the successful application of the IBM 
strategy such as the facilitation of traffic, trade and border controls, action against 
cross-border crime, irregular migration and terrorism as well as the cooperation 
with the countries of origin and transit of crime and irregular migration. 
Additionally, with the development of an IBM strategy the EU aimed to detect 
persons who are running serious risks in attempting to enter the EU irregularly 
and to enable appropriate measures by the border control services (Council 2006: 
5-6).  
According to Carrera (2007: 4) the “first generation of the EU IBM” was 
created by two achievements: the adoption of the Schengen Borders Code and the 
establishment of Frontex. The development of the legislative framework of the 
EU’s border policies is subject of the following section. 
 
 
2.3 The development of the EU’s border management 
policy 
 
 
Before the EU’s efforts to manage its frontiers are scrutinized, it appears 
necessary to outline the legislative development of the EU’s border policies 
briefly to provide background knowledge for the later analysis. 
One of the first attempts of border control cooperation occurred outside of 
the framework of European treaties: the Schengen Agreement of 1985. It was 
signed by Belgium, France, (West) Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands at 
a symbolic location on the river Mosel where the borders of France, Germany and 
Luxembourg meet. The Schengen Agreement, complemented by the ‘Schengen 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement’6, abolished internal border 
controls between the participating states. Additionally, it established common 
rules and cooperation in migration, visas and asylum. Nevertheless, it took 
                                                          
5
 Please consult Chapter 4.1 on methodology, since the four-tier access control model will be used 
as the basis for the methodological framework of this study. 
6
 Hereafter: the ‘Schengen Convention’ 
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additional five years before the Schengen Convention finally implemented 
common uniform principles of border control based on a European legal basis. 
These principles were laid down in a ‘Common Manual for External Borders’ 
(Commission 2002: 6; Monar 2006: 175). By 1997 nearly all EU MS had signed 
the Schengen Agreement. However, whereas the UK and Ireland did not sign the 
agreement, Denmark only opted out of some parts. The Schengen Protocol as 
appendix to the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 finally integrated the Schengen 
acquis into EU legislation (Council 2002a; Geddes 2012: 272; Lavenex 2010: 
463). 
With the creation of the pillar system by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, 
border control became an explicit matter of European internal security. Since then, 
border management has fallen within the competence of JHA (Geddes 2012: 266). 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, together with the Tampere Programme (1999-2004), 
coined the idea of the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) and 
declared it a fundamental objective of the EU by enshrining it in Title V of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
In 2001, the Laeken European Council initiated the discussion concerning 
the development of a EU IBM strategy by stating in its Conclusion that “[b]etter 
management of the Union's external border controls will help in the fight against 
terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the traffic in human beings” 
(European Council 2001: 12). The next significant step on the path towards a 
European IBM was taken by the Commission in 2002 by publishing the 
Communication ‘Towards integrated management of the external borders of the 
Member States of the European Union’. The document included possible 
approaches for developing a common policy for managing external borders 
(Hobbing 2005: 1). Subsequently, the Council adopted a ‘Plan for the 
management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union’ 
in 2002 containing five integral elements of IBM: common cooperation and 
coordination mechanism, personnel and inter-operational equipment, common 
integrated risk analysis as well as a common corpus of legislation and burden 
sharing (Council 2002a). The Seville European Council in 2002 approved the plan 
pursuing an increase of synergies among the MS (Council 2002b). In 2006, the 
JHA Council published strategic deliberations of the IBM and by this further 
defined its scope (Council 2006).  
Two years later, the Hague Programme (2004-2009) was drafted. It was a 
derivative of the Tampere Programme. Among others, the Hague Programme 
emphasized the ‘external dimension’ of internal security by focusing on 
cooperation with non-EU MS. The 2009 Stockholm Programme contained a 
subsequent action plan and renewed the external focus (European Council 2010). 
The key elements were addressed in the Treaty of Lisbon which made the 
institutional processes and Community decision-making rules applicable for 
almost all matters of internal security, including border control (Geddes 2012: 
266, 280-281). 
In 2008, the Commission published three Communications, also known as 
the ‘Border Package’, covering the evaluation and future development of Frontex, 
the European border surveillance system (EUROSUR) and future challenges for 
EU external border management (Council 2009: 17). By adopting an ‘Internal 
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Security Strategy’ in 2010, the Council operationalized cooperation between law 
enforcement, border and judicial authorities, before in February 2013 the 
Commission published a new ‘smart border package’ of measures to reinforce 
border checks and surveillance and to improve operational coordination 
(Commission 2013c). The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 turned the former 
intergovernmental character of JHA (including border controls) into a 
supranational one by granting rights to the European Parliament (EP) through the 
ordinary legislative procedure and by giving the right of initiative to the 
Commission. The provisions on border control are nowadays laid down in chapter 
two ‘Policies on Border Checks, Migration and Asylum’, Title V, particularly in 
Article 77 TFEU. 
Based on this legislative framework various measures of IBM were taken on 
the operational level. These efforts as well as the cooperation and coordination of 
the multiple means are scrutinized in Chapter 5. 
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3 Theoretical considerations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the concepts related to border management and the European IBM 
strategy in particular were introduced, it is necessary to discuss the concepts of 
cooperation and coordination as integral elements of IBM to establish the 
principal theoretical basis. 
 
 
3.1 Coordination  
 
 
Well-functioning and effective coordination is an indispensable condition of 
the EU’s IBM strategy. But what does coordination actually mean? Various 
disciplines have already approached the concept of coordination. Reviewing the 
respective literature, the term is frequently utilized by scholars and politicians but 
rarely defined. Generally, Chisholm (1989: 13) considers coordination as an 
attempt “to bring about some kind of order”. In more depth, Malone and 
Crowston determine coordination as “the act of managing interdependencies 
between activities performed to achieve a goal” (1990: 361). Therefore, the 
emphasis lies on “interdependencies” as the actors are aiming at achieving a 
“common objective” (Malone & Crowston 1990: 362).  
This definition can also be applied to the management of the EU’s external 
borders. As aforementioned, the EU has developed different means and 
cooperates with several stakeholders pursuing the same objective: border security 
and control. Thus, there are interdependencies between the activities of the 
policies, mechanisms and actors which require a well-functioning management, 
and thus coordination, according to the outlined definition by Malone and 
Crowston.  
But how can coordination be achieved? Generally drawing from the 
respective literature it is arguable that coordination depends to a large extent on 
the relations between the actors involved in the policy that needs to be 
coordinated. Thereby, “any organization is dependent on other organizations for 
resources” (Rhodes 2006: 433). Accordingly, “actors employ strategies within 
known rules of the game to regulate the process of exchange” (Rhodes 2006: 
433), leading to different modes of coordination. 
The most commonly known coordination modes are hierarchy and network. 
In this regard, a system coordinated by hierarchy features a top-down command 
structure with clear standards and rules to ensure the regulated action of 
subordinate bodies (Jordan & Schout 2008: 15). Thus, a hierarchy’s main element 
is the “overt rule-driven design and direction” (Thompson 2003: 22). 
Nevertheless, Chisholm (1989: 13) stresses that this mode is not necessarily 
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indispensable, as coordination “may consist of a number of things of equal rank or 
of a number of actions or processes properly combined”. In this respect scholars 
bring in a second mode of coordination as alternative to hierarchies: networks. A 
popular definition comes from Kickert, Klijn and Koopenjan (in Adam & Kriesi 
2007: 132), defining networks as “(more or less) stable patterns of social relations 
between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or 
policy programme”. Other scholars determine ‘policy networks’7 more 
specifically as “sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between 
governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated 
beliefs and interests in public policymaking and implementation” (Rhodes 2006: 
426). In this regard, important characteristics of a policy network are that the 
members are essentially equal, have mutual interests and are dependent on each 
other (Adam & Kriesi 2007: 129; Jordan & Schout 2008: 16).  
In a quintessence, networks and hierarchies can both be considered tools to 
“manage interdependencies” and thus to ensure coordination. Thereby, the mode 
of coordination depends on the particular relation between the involved actors to a 
large extent (Adam & Kriesi 2007: 130; Thompson 2003). 
Most scholars agree that generally coordination in the EU appears in 
network structures (e.g. Jordan & Schout 2008; Jönsson & Strömvik 2005). This 
however might not be the case for coordinating the different efforts undertaken by 
the EU in the field of IBM. As previously outlined, border management is 
considered high politics by touching profound and vital interests of the MS. 
Therefore, managing and coordinating the security of the EU’s frontiers varies to 
a certain extent from low politics and the general management of the EU. 
Furthermore, the European IBM strategy also considers the cooperation and 
interaction with various actors outside the EU. In this regard, the coordination 
modes are very likely to differ compared to the general EU internal coordination. 
Therefore, the question arises which mode is present in coordinating the EU’s 
IBM.  
Drawing on literature
8
, some criteria
9
 (cf. Table 1) can be identified that 
constitute the characters of the coordination modes of hierarchy and networks. 
These criteria guide the later analysis in terms of determining the particular form 
of coordination in both the horizontal and vertical dimension of European border 
management. 
  
                                                          
7
 There are various forms of policy networks such as epistemic communities, issue networks, iron 
triangles, policy sub-systems or policy communities (more information please consult Rhodes 
(2006)).  
8
 The criteria are derived primarily from the work of Adam  & Kriesi (2007); Arino (1997); 
Chisholm (1989); Jönsson & Strömvik (2005); Lavenex & Wichmann 2009; Rhodes  (2006); 
Schout & Jordan (2008) and Thompson (2003). 
9
 The criteria illustrate the ideal types of the coordination modes of hierarchy and networks. 
Rhodes (in Jönsson & Strömvik 2005: 17) already noted “it’s the mix [between the types] that 
matters”. Hence, in the empirical analysis (Chapter 5), the findings might point to variant forms or 
combinations of both modes of coordination. 
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 Table 1. Criteria determining the mode of coordination 
 
Hierarchy Network 
 Top-down structure  
 Political and/or economic 
leverage 
 Clear standards and rules 
(monitoring of 
compliance) 
 Asymmetric dependence10 
 Specific reciprocity11  
 
 Essentially equal actors/ 
relative balance of power  
 institutional linkages/ 
Social patterns  
 Built on trust and loyalty 
 Mutual interests/ 
Symmetric 
interdependence
12
 
 Diffuse reciprocity13 
 
Much research has been conducted concerning the coordination of the EU 
and within its MS (Schout & Jordan 2008: 4). However, only few scholarly 
literature deals with the coordination of the various actors and mechanisms of 
policy enforcement in external border management. In this context the 
aforementioned multilevel governance approach by Hooghe and Marks can be 
considered one concept that deals with the handling of policy coordination across 
multiple layers. In short, multilevel governance describes the interacting authority 
structures at different territorial levels for decision-making within the EU. The 
approach takes into account the various actors involved such as supranational, 
national, regional and local state and non-state actors. In this regard, governance is 
understood as “coordinating multiple players in a complex stetting of mutual 
dependence” (Kohler-Koch: in Jönsson & Strömvik 2005: 13).  
The system of European IBM can be studies from the perspective of multi-
level governance, as the EU developed various mechanisms at different levels to 
manage its external borders. Moreover, this approach appears to be suited for the 
thesis’ aim as it takes multiple stakeholders at varying levels of policy-making 
into account. Nonetheless, since IBM also involves stakeholders from outside the 
EU, the original approach needs to be extended by adding an ‘external level’.  
Furthermore, Hooghe and Marks argue that the actors of all political arenas 
and levels are interconnected. As initially mentioned, according to them, the 
interaction among these actors occurs in a vertical and in a horizontal dimension 
(Hooghe & Marks 2001: 1-4). Hence, using the multi-level governance approach 
allows for an understanding of the issue’s complexity within and between levels. 
To structure the multi-layered policy area of IBM, the following thesis refers the 
system of European IBM as a four-level model by investigating into the different 
                                                          
10
 In this thesis, asymmetric dependency means that one party is more depended on the benefits of 
the relation than the other party. 
11
 Specific reciprocity means “situation in which specified partners exchange items of equivalent 
value in a strictly delimited sequence” (Keohane, in Jönsson & Strömvik 2005: 20). 
12 In a network mode of coordination, this thesis refers to symmetric interdependence as a 
situation where all parties are equally deepened on each other. 
13 Diffuse reciprocity means that “the participants do not insist on immediate and exactly 
equivalent reciprocation of each and every concession, on an appropriate ‘quid’ for every ‘quo’” 
(Jönsson & Strömvik 2005: 20). 
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levels
14
 of border management and how they are interconnected and coordinated. 
Thereby, the study aims to explore which modes of coordination occur both 
within the different levels (horizontal dimension) and across the levels of border 
management (vertical dimension). 
 
 
3.2 Cooperation 
 
 
The next concept that is important to be defined is closely linked to 
coordination: cooperation. Cooperation is just like coordination a significant 
concept and integral part of the European IBM strategy. Thus, it can be said that 
the whole concept of IBM is built upon cooperation among different actors at and 
between the multiple levels of border management. 
In its IBM strategy, the Commission stressed the importance of internal and 
international cooperation (Commission 2004a: 19-23). But what do we understand 
by cooperation? Like coordination, cooperation is approached by diverse 
disciplines of research. Especially in the field of international relations, 
cooperation is a well-known and often utilized concept.  
Arino (1997: 215-219) points out, that cooperation includes two particular 
elements: veracity and commitments. Thus, actors that intend to cooperate shall 
act truthfully as well as endeavour to make efforts. These basic values are 
embedded in the self-conception of the EU since cooperation is a fundamental 
assumption of the EU and enshrined in many parts of the European Treaties. 
Nonetheless, cooperation within the EU often differs from other kinds of bilateral 
or multilateral cooperation. Therefore in the case of the European IBM strategy, 
cooperation has to be distinguished from the general cooperation within the EU, 
as border policies are a field of high politics and involve a variety of stakeholders, 
including third actors from outside the EU. Thus, it is arguable that external actors 
require further incentives to cooperate with the EU in securing European borders. 
Thus, the commitments made by the actors are very likely to differ and thus may 
lead to varying levels of cooperation.  
Furthermore, according to Adam and Kiresi (2007: 134) there are three 
levels of cooperation: conflict/competition, bargaining/negotiation and 
cooperation. In this regard, as the form and the degree of cooperation is to a great 
part intertwined with the stakeholders’ relation, it affects in turn the coordination 
mode. Hence, using the words of Jönsson (1986: 42), “the ability of each 
participating actor to gain his ends is dependent on the behaviour of other 
participating actors”, in short ‘strategic interdependence’ leading to ‘strategic 
interaction’. Consequently, for cooperation to occur, incentives and a certain 
degree of interdependence between the actors is necessary (Axelrod 1981: 307). 
Thus, the conditions of cooperation in turn determine the mode of coordination. 
Accordingly, the later analysis pursues to investigate the stakeholders’ 
cooperation in European IBM and thereby detect how it is coordinated.  
                                                          
14
 The four filters of IBM are measures of border management outside the EU, in cooperation with 
the Schengen area, at the external borders and measures inside the territories of the MS. This 
model and its utilization as framework for this study are explained more in detail in Chapter 4.  
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4 Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the theoretical foundation is set, the research design and methodology 
of this study is introduced. The above-outlined concepts of coordination and 
cooperation as well as the multilevel governance approach are employed in a 
deductive approach. Thus, these broad theoretical concepts are narrowed down for 
the needs of this study and thereby evolved and refined as basis for further 
research in the field of European IBM.  
In the course of the EU’s IBM development a four-tier access control model 
was created that is now utilized as a template and reference for this thesis’ 
analysis. The following section describes the original model in a first step before 
launching an altered version of the model serving as framework to guide the later 
analysis. 
 
 
4.1 The original four-tier access control model 
 
 
According to the EU (Council 2002a: 9), IBM is “spread over four 
complementary tiers”. Based on this, a respective model was developed as part of 
the EU Schengen Catalogue
15
 in 2002, called the ‘four-tier access control model’. 
It exposed a system covering the complex aspects and different levels of European 
IBM. 
 
The four tiers of the model are:  
 
 activities in third countries, countries of origin and transit  
 bilateral and international cooperation (cooperation with neighbouring 
countries) 
 measures at the external borders  
 activities inside the territories. (Council 2002a: 11) 
 
The first tier covers the activities of border management in third countries. It 
requires the cooperation with liaison offices and staff from the Schengen countries 
in third countries with a focus on countries of origin and transit of cross-border 
crime (Article 47 Schengen Convention). They are meant to give advice and 
                                                          
15
 The EU Schengen Catalogue’s purpose is to clarify and outline the Schengen acquis by 
indicating recommendations and best practices meant as guidelines for states acceding to the 
Schengen area, but also for those who fully apply the Schengen acquis already (Council 2002: 7). 
In course of the developments in the field of border management, the initial Schengen Catalogue 
of 2002 needed to be revised and updated in 2006 and 2009, also by including the work and 
cooperation tasks performed by Frontex into the four-tier access control model. 
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training regarding visa processes to consular officials in third countries 
determined in Articles 15 and 17 (Council 2002a: 12). 
The second tier treats border control in multilateral, bilateral and local 
international cooperation. Here, the focus is lying especially on the cooperation 
with neighbouring countries. Concerning this matter, the Catalogue recommends 
the establishment communication channels and local contact points to exchange 
information, develop emergency procedures and handle incidents in an objective 
manner to avoid political disputes (Council 2002a: 13). 
Measures at the external borders determine the third tier of the four-tier access 
control model which covers the “core area of general border strategy” (Council 
2002a: 14) meaning border checks and surveillance based on risk analysis. 
Accordingly, the Catalogue outlines measures to be taken for safeguarding the 
external borders: the development of coherent legislation and an appropriate 
infrastructure consisting of both material and human resources. Furthermore, a 
clear concept of training is required covering operational skills, knowledge of 
legislation and language training. To ensure internal coordination, information 
exchange between the authorities and a clear allocation of competences is 
essential (Council 2002a: 14-15). 
The last tier deals with activities inside the territories of the Schengen 
countries aiming at preventing illegal immigration and cross-border crime 
internally through measures enforced by the national authorities in accordance 
with the respective national law. Thereby, police cooperation between the 
Schengen countries may support national action (Article 39(4), (5) Schengen 
Convention). Moreover, the fourth tier comprises repatriation pursuant to national 
law, Article 23 of the Schengen Convention, humanitarian grounds and 
international law (Council 2002a: 15). 
 
 
4.2 An altered four-level model of border management 
 
 
As aforementioned, the four-tier access control model was initially designed 
for managing the borders of the Schengen area. However, this thesis pursues the 
objective of investigating the efforts primarily undertaken in the name of the EU 
to manage the European external borders. Accordingly, the cooperation with the 
associated Schengen countries is regarded as one separate approach and thus as a 
level of IBM in itself. Therefore, the original model is altered slightly to suit the 
needs of this thesis.  
 
Like the original model, the altered one consists of four levels. The 
measures are regarded intently from the very outside of the EU (cooperation with 
third actors) to the inside (measures within the EU MS’ territories).  
 
 Measures in cooperation with third actors 
 Measures in cooperation with the associated Schengen countries 
 Measures of border control by the EU 
 Internal measures by the MS. 
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The first level of the altered model concentrates, like the original model, on 
measures of border control undertaken outside the EU. However, the main 
difference is that this study aims not at focusing only on activities in third 
countries, but also on activities in cooperation with third actors. Thus, while the 
original four-tier access control model dealt with border management through 
liaison officers giving advice and training to the third country personnel, this 
study’s first level investigates the general cooperation with third countries in 
forms of agreements and programmes. Regarding this, the cooperation with 
neighbouring countries is seen as an integral part of the first level. Consequently, 
since the original four-tier access control model approaches multilateral, bilateral 
and local cooperation with a special emphasis on the neighbouring countries in its 
second tier, the altered model combines tier one and two of the original model in 
its first level. Among these third countries the EU cooperates with to ensure the 
security of its external borders, two types of countries can be identified: third 
countries without any direct geographical connection to the EU and third countries 
in the European neighbourhood. Further, this study also discusses the cooperation 
with international organisations as third actors.  
The cooperation within the Schengen area and thus cooperation with the 
associated Schengen states is scrutinized in the second level of the thesis’ altered 
model. This level does not exist in this form in the original four-tier access control 
model of the EU Schengen Catalogue. However, the Swiss Federal Office for 
Migration developed a national four-filter model (cf. Swiss FOM 2012) whose 
second filter constitutes of the Schengen cooperation which is applied in this 
thesis’ analysis as second level. The second filter of the respective Swiss model 
covers, like the EU’s four-tier access control model, bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation with other countries. However, the difference between the two 
models is that the Swiss model focuses on the Schengen area (Swiss FOM 2012: 
1) whereas the second tier of the four-tier access control model deals with the 
EU’s neighbourhood. Therefore, in this thesis, the second level of the altered 
model follows the Swiss model and discusses the EU’s cooperation with the four 
associated Schengen countries. 
Common European measures of border control at the EU’s external borders 
constitute the study’s third level. This layer is very similar to the original fourth 
tier of the four-tier access control model as it covers means of joint EU actions to 
directly manage the European frontiers.  
The fourth level of the altered model is also closely related to the original 
model by covering measures inside the territories of the EU MS. The sole 
difference is the fact that in the case of the adjusted model the internal measures 
of the European MS are taken into account, whereas the original model considers 
all internal activities of both EU MS and associated Schengen countries. Thus, the 
emphasis of this fourth level lies on the national measures undertaken 
independently from common EU action. In this regard, it is necessary to mention 
that border control is still a prerogative of the MS and that therefore the EU’s IBM 
is only binding to a certain extent. Accordingly, as the overarching research 
question refers to the IBM efforts carried out jointly in the name of the EU, the 
last level concerning the national measures conducted independently by the 28 
MS is not significant for answering the research question and is hence excluded 
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from the analysis. Nevertheless, one has to consider that the national efforts are 
partly interconnected (e.g. by bilateral agreements) and thus affect the EU’s action 
in border management to a certain extent. 
Summarizing, this thesis utilizes an altered version of the original four-tier 
access control model of the EU Schengen Catalogue to guide and structure the 
analyses. By doing so, this thesis aims at gaining more in-depth knowledge and at 
generating a new theoretical framework for further research within the field of 
European border management with a particular focus on coordination.  
 
 
4.3 The research design  
 
 
Since the different means undertaken by the EU to secure its external 
borders and their coordination are subject to critical scrutiny, the question arises 
which research design is appropriate to obtain the intended gain in knowledge.  
First of all, merely no literature exists on how the different levels of border 
management are interconnected and coordinated so that this thesis will be an 
exploratory study. This kind of study is “characterized by a lack of detailed 
preliminary research” and “generally distinguished by the absence of preliminary 
propositions and hypotheses” (Streb 2010: 372). Furthermore, exploratory studies 
are often used as a basis for consecutive research (Streb 2010: 372). 
As Malone and Crowston (1990: 357) point out, “good coordination is 
nearly invisible”. Therefore, in order to examine the interconnection and 
coordination of the different levels of European IBM, the instrument of a case 
study stands to reason. Referring to Gerring and McDermott (2007: 688) a case 
study is “a form of analysis where one or a few units are studied intensively with 
an aim to elucidate features of a broader class of (…) units”. Thus, such research 
design “allows the investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events” (Yin 1994: 3). Thereby, it facilitates the 
achievement of in-depth knowledge of the issue’s underlying mechanism and the 
analysis of complex causal relations (Kacowicz 2002: 120). On account of their 
advantage to address causal complexity, case studies are regarded to be strong 
where statistical methods are rather weak (George & Bennett 2005: 19). 
Accordingly, the case study design is especially suited for the purpose of this 
study as it allows investigating the underlying coordination mode within and 
between the multiple levels of IBM. Additionally to the fact that it appears to be a 
useful tool considering the complexity of this policy field, a case study is suited 
for the heuristic purposes of this study (Kacowicz 2002: 128; George & Bennett 
2005: 20). Another advantage is the fact that the design allows a high level of 
conceptual validity for concepts that are usually difficult to measure with 
statistical methods and formal models (George & Bennett 2005: 19). This positive 
feature is utilized when investigating into the theoretical concepts of cooperation 
and coordination in IBM.  
As the thesis’ objective is to gain knowledge about the policies and actors in 
border management as well as about their coordination, within-case analyses in 
the three levels are conducted. In a first step, the relationship between the EU and 
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the respective actors of each level are scrutinized separately to gain a better 
understanding of the mode of coordination in the particular level (horizontal 
dimension) (Chapter 5.1). Subsequently, Chapter 5.2 investigates the coordination 
between the cases and thus the different levels (vertical dimension). 
The particular cases for each level are selected by purpose due to the fact 
that the random selection of cases is no option in small-N case studies (Gerring 
2007: 87). Furthermore, the purposive sampling “can nonetheless make an 
important contribution to the inferential process by enabling researchers to choose 
the most appropriate cases” (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 295). As a case is 
determined “an instance of a class of events” (George & Bennett 2005: 5), all 
cases selected for this study belong to the ‘class’ of coordination in the EU’s 
border management
16
. Since coordination depends on the relationships between 
the particular actors, the cases are selected according to the EU’s relation to the 
stakeholders in the particular level of border management. Based on literature 
review, it is arguable that the EU’s relationship towards all respective actors 
involved in the four levels differs, leading presumably to a variation in the mode 
of coordination.  
In this context, typical cases are especially suited for the study as they are 
considered to be representatives of the phenomena, namely coordination in the 
EU’s border management. By examining a typical case, the interest lies in the 
characteristics within that particular case (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 299; 
Gerring 2007: 90ff). In this thesis, the characteristic of interest is the particular 
mode of coordination in the levels of European IBM. Based on that, the chosen 
cases are the following: 
 
Table 2. Case selection 
 
  
                                                          
16
 Thereby, ‘EU’s border management’ is understood as where the EU acts collectively as a union, 
meaning action in border management through the European institutions or competent European 
agencies and not through single member states. 
Level Measure Cases 
Third county without geographical connection
USA
Third country in the EU’s neighbourhood :
Russia (Strategic Partner)
Western Balkans, Turkey (Candidate countries)
ENP countries
International organisation : 
UN, IOM, Interpol
Level 2
Measures within the associated 
Schengen countries
Associated Schengen countries 
Level 3 Measures of border control by the EU Frontex, COSI, WGs, European Insitutions
Level 4
Internal measures within the MS’ 
territories
Level 1
Measures in cooperation with third 
actors
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 Besides the advantages derived from a case study, the research design also 
involves difficulties. Since the cooperation between the various actors is of 
dynamic nature and frequently occurs through informal channels, coordination is 
often difficult to seize. Therefore, a case study cannot precisely detect whether 
other potential third variables - which might have been neglected - have a possible 
impact on the outcome of the study. Thus, Gerring and McDermott (2007: 688) 
cite the non-experimental characteristic of a case study as a disadvantage, arguing 
that “case studies are often observational, rather than experimental“. Additionally, 
in most instances single case studies do not provide a sufficient foundation for 
generalizations (Yin 1994).  
Considering these problems, the question arises why the research design of 
a case study could still be applied? The following thesis tries to counter these 
threats by its methodological and theoretical approach. Thus, the observations are 
structured to plot the interconnection of the actors and mechanisms’ coordination 
by employing the above-outlined framework of the four-filter model. This model 
functions as a tool to scrutinize the different levels and thereby establish an order 
of analysis. Furthermore, the following thesis does not aim at generalizing the 
chosen cases, but rather to utilize them to get first insights of coordination and 
cooperation, as it is generally the aim of an exploratory study (Streb 2010: 372). 
This shall therefore serve as a basis for subsequent more in-depth research.  
In order to conduct the case studies, information and qualitative data are 
collected from both primary and secondary sources. Due to the fact that merely 
little research has been conducted concerning the coordination of policies, actors 
and mechanisms in European IBM, secondary literature is used to receive 
information about the actors and European policies in the respective levels. 
Additionally, the study employs official documents. Nonetheless, one has to take 
into account that “important political processes often lack an accompanying body 
of documentation” (Tansey 2007: 8). Accordingly, interviews with officials17 are 
used to complement and reinforce the knowledge gathered through secondary 
literature and document research.  
Summarizing, although case studies face some threats, such as potentially 
being unable to abstract all findings on a general level or being biased through 
possible alternative explanations, this research design appears to be suited. Thus 
case studies are used to demonstrate the complex and dynamic nature of IBM by 
filtering the competent actors in the respective levels as well as to examine 
whether and how the different efforts of European border management are 
coordinated.  
  
                                                          
17
 For the purpose of this study semi-structured telephone interviews with the spokesperson of 
Frontex, with an employee from the Swiss Directorate for European Affairs (DEA), Section for 
Justice and Home Affairs as well as with an employee from the German Federal Ministry of 
Interior (FMI) were conducted. In this regard, one possible threat which appears essential to 
mention is that due to the sensitivity of border security the interviewees might not be that 
subjective and open with information.   
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5 Coordination of the European Union’s 
border management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the necessary foundation is set, the following Chapter 5.1 concentrates 
on the horizontal dimension of European border management by answering the 
first sub-question: “What are the different efforts undertaken by the EU to manage 
its external borders and how does the cooperation and coordination with the 
respective actor(s) look like?”. Thus, the focus is lying on the relationship and 
cooperation of the various actors with the EU and thereby on the mode of 
coordination within the respective level.  
Subsequently, Chapter 5.2 investigates the relation between the different 
levels (vertical dimension) in order to answer the second sub-question: “How are 
the different levels of border management interconnected and coordinated?".  
Chapter 5.3 finally compares and merges the findings of both dimensions. 
 
 
5.1 The horizontal dimension 
 
 
5.1.1 Level one: Measures of border management in cooperation with third 
actors 
 
In times of globalisation, internal security cannot be achieved without an 
external dimension and international cooperation. This is also applicable to the 
protection of the EU’s external borders. Article 216(1) TFEU provides the legal 
basis for the EU to conclude agreements with third countries and international 
organizations. In this regard, the first level of the altered four-level model 
concentrates on border management in cooperation with third actors outside the 
EU and the Schengen area. As aforementioned, this thesis’ altered model does not 
solely concentrate on measures of the EU in third countries but also on measures 
of cooperation with third actors in general, including international organizations.  
 
5.1.1.1 Measures in cooperation with third countries  
 
Already since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 the EU has the possibility to 
negotiate and conclude agreements with third countries on all AFSJ matters 
(Monar 2010: 31). The introduction of the EU’s legal personality by the Treaty of 
Lisbon further “ensure[s] that the Union can negotiate more effectively with key 
partners” (European Council 2010: 34).  
One of the first attempts to collaborate with non-EU partners in IBM was 
enshrined in the aforementioned Tampere Programme’s external dimension. A 
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more recent effort can be found in the 2011 renewed Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM). It strengthened the commitment towards 
operational cooperation and dialogue with third countries to combat irregular 
migration, cross border crime and to ensure border security (Commission 2011). 
Notwithstanding that border management primarily falls within JHA, many 
efforts of border control outside the EU and Schengen area are also implemented 
by CFSP missions. However, the weakness of the EU’s competence in external 
policy and the fact that the EU itself does not dispose of operational assets for 
border control but even more relies on the capabilities of its MS are often 
regarded as challenges (Monar 2012: 59-60; Weinar 2011: 3).  
The original four-tier access control model offers the establishment of 
liaison offices as well as the responsibility of MS’ embassies and missions in third 
countries for issuing visa as one approach to ensure control over border crossings 
into the EU (Council 2009: 13-14). The following sections investigate further 
European measures of border security in cooperation with third countries. 
Thereby, the focus lies on the EU-third country relationship to detect the 
particular mode of coordination. 
Among these countries the EU cooperates with, two ‘types’ can be 
identified: third countries without direct geographical connections to the EU and 
third countries in the European neighbourhood. At this point it appears necessary 
to draw this distinction since cooperation and thus coordination in IBM is 
regarded to differ according to the stakeholders’ relationship. 
 
Third countries without a direct geographical connection to the EU  
 
The first group of countries the EU maintains relations with for the purpose 
of ensuring its frontiers are states that are no direct European neighbours. 
Reviewing official documents and secondary literature, the EU is involved in 
many projects to develop IBM systems in non-neighbouring countries or stabilizes 
these through development aid. This is done in order to prevent and combat cross-
border crime and irregular migration with the indirect purpose to ensure border 
security. Nevertheless, this thesis aims at investigating the EU’s efforts to directly 
manage its own external borders. 
The US-EU collaboration is considered a typical case for cooperation in 
border control with a third country that is not situated in the EU’s neighbourhood. 
Although on both transatlantic sides somehow different approaches of border 
management are applied, the EU and the USA frequently cooperate in several 
aspects of border security. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the transatlantic 
cooperation was further enhanced (Archick 2013). For effective law enforcement 
the American authorities, Frontex and Europol maintain close relations (Archick 
2013: 4). Besides of formal agreements between the agencies, an exchange of 
information and best practices on border management takes place regularly 
(Council 2011a: 16). 
As organised crime and terrorism frequently involves international travel 
and thereby enters the EU via its border crossing-points, an effective management 
of the official points of entry is necessary. Thus, referring back to the initially 
mentioned EU definition which includes “airports, river ports, sea ports and lake 
 24 
 
ports” (EU 2006: Article 2(2)), the Passenger Name Record (PNR)18 agreement 
between the EU and the USA is considered one important endeavour to secure the 
airports as they are international gateways and thus significant points to cross 
European borders. 
The initial agreement facilitating the transmission of passenger data between 
the EU and USA was concluded in 2004, followed by a renewed agreement in 
2007. Nevertheless due to data protection concerns, the EP postponed its vote. 
Until the final agreement, many discrepancies existed between the respective 
actors, especially regarding the privacy standards and data protection. On account 
of fears of privacy rights’ violations, the EP brought the case to the European 
Court of Justice which in turn annulled the PNR agreement with the reasoning 
that it lacked a proper legal basis (Archick 2013: 12; Hobbing & Koslowski 2009: 
13). Based on an external PNR strategy (Commission 2010), the EU finally 
concluded the agreement in November 2011. In April 2012, it was approved and 
adopted by the EP, and entered into force in July 2012 (Archick 2013: 15).  
Drawing on literature, the cooperation with the USA in terms of border 
control can be regarded to be limited in most cases to the exchange of 
information. Nevertheless regarding the EU-US relationship, both sides are 
considered more or less equal actors based on a relative balance of power and a 
mutual interest in controlling the entry/exit of passengers for security reasons. 
This is underlined by the fact that the agreement was not concluded until the 
European objections concerning data protection were solved. Despite the presence 
of specific reciprocity, the cooperation seemed to be based on a symmetric 
interdependence. This is because both transatlantic partners depend on the other’s 
information to control the entries via the respective airports. Summarizing, the 
EU’s efforts in border control in cooperation with the USA are characterized by a 
network mode of coordination.  
 
Third countries in the direct neighbourhood of the EU 
 
The second group of countries the EU cooperates with consists of the 
European neighbours. With the latest enlargement of 2004 and 2007, the 
European external borders moved further eastwards. As Günther Verheugen, 
Commissioner responsible for the 2004 enlargement, said “enlargement is proving 
a success in expanding the area of stability and prosperity in Europe. However, 
this area can only be sustainable if it also extends to our neighbourhood” 
(Verheugen 2003: 4).  
Drawing on previous reading, it is arguable that the EU’s relation to its 
neighbours differs. Referring to appendix 1, the European neighbourhood can 
                                                          
18
 PNR data are information provided by passengers which are collected and stored by air carriers 
in their databases. These data are used for almost 60 years now by states worldwide to combat 
crime and terrorism. The agreement between the USA and the EU on PNR regulates that the data 
shall be used for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of serious transnational 
crimes and in particular terrorism (EU 2013a). By concluding this agreement, the entry and exit of 
persons via the European airports shall be controlled. This “prevention mechanism” was also part 
of the EU’s Internal Security Strategy (Council 2010a: 12). Similar agreements on PNR were 
signed jointly with Australia in 2008 and 2012 and with Canada in 2006. The latter is currently 
renegotiated. 
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further be subdivided into three types: strategic partner, candidate country and 
participant of the ENP.  
 
Strategic Partner  
The Russian Federation is the biggest and most powerful country in the 
European neighbourhood. After the latest enlargement, the European-Russian 
border comprises more than 2200 kilometres with five EU MS bordering directly 
to Russia. Especially due to these reasons the country is seen primarily as a 
strategic partner (Verheugen 2003: 8). The instrument of a strategic partnership is 
not properly defined yet as neither the Treaties nor any other EU document 
specifies its nature. However, one hint can be found in Articles 21 and 22 TEU: 
“The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third 
countries, and international, regional or global organisations”. Although the 
existing ten strategic partnerships of the EU differ, they all intend to define the 
particular relations and thereby function as framework for further cooperation 
(Cîrlig 2012).  
The EU-Russian relationship is primarily based on a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement
19
 (PCA). Notwithstanding that the EU maintains ten 
strategic partnerships worldwide and concluded different PCAs with its 
neighbouring countries, Russia is the only immediate neighbour of the EU that is 
labelled a ‘strategic partner’. Nevertheless, the EU-Russian relation20 can be 
characterized by both cooperation and competition. In this context, the weight of 
this partnership is often said to be diminished by the lack of a coherent EU policy 
towards Russia (Shapovalova 2011: 33) resulting in a loss of trust and loyalty. 
The PCA dates back to 1994 and already then included provisions on a joint 
fight against cross-border crime. However, according to Golunov (2013: 126), 
here the first asymmetries became visible as the agreement seemed to imply that 
the cooperation dealt with crime of Russian origin and that “Russia should adopt 
the EU’s best practices, rather than vice versa”. Since the St. Petersburg Summit 
in May 2003, cooperation is divided into ‘four common spaces’. Accordingly, the 
‘Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice’ focuses on cooperation on 
fighting illegal migration, terrorism and cross-border crime by including 
provisions for border management (Commission 2007b: 14-16). 
Due to its extensive economic and military power and its cultural links, 
Russia has considerable influence on the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood 
(Shapovalova 2010: 34). However, Russia is also a ‘country of origin and transit 
of irregular migration’ as Frontex reports that in the second and third quarter of 
2013 Russian nationals constituted the highest share of nationalities whom the 
entry into the EU at a European external border was refused
21
 (Frontex 2013a: 
48).  
                                                          
19
 PCAs offer neither a prospective membership, nor any other kind of association with the EU. 
20
 For more detailed information about the character and the history of the Russian border 
management as well as the EU-Russian relationship in various means of cross-border cooperation, 
please consult Golunov (2013). 
21
 Q2: 10578 and Q3: 5930 refusals of entry which amounts 18% (Q3) of all refusals of entry at the 
European external borders (Frontex 2013a: 48). 
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On account of these reasons, Russia can be considered inevitable for securing the 
EU’s external borders. Consequently, Frontex concluded working arrangements 
with the Russian Border Guards concerning the establishment of operational 
cooperation (Commission 2007b: 14-16). Furthermore, besides of bilateral 
cooperation between EU MS and Russia
22
, the EU and the Russian Federation 
arranged different mutual accords regarding the security of their common borders.  
One important instrument to ensure and enhance effective border 
management cooperation is included in the ongoing negotiation process 
concerning an EU-Russian visa regime. At the 2003 summit the negotiations on a 
future visa-free regime were opened and resulted into a visa facilitation agreement 
in 2006. Based on this, operational measures and more specific steps
23
 of the so-
called Visa Dialogue were jointly elaborated and adopted in a document called 
“Common steps towards visa free short-term travel of Russian and EU citizens” in 
2011. It contained a significant section about border management with a 
commitment to enhance cooperation and to optimise the mechanism. Both 
partners agreed to “deploy appropriate staff, resources, technical equipment and 
infrastructure at the relevant parts of the state border, as well as effectively 
implement border control procedures and best practices at their common state 
border crossing points” (EU-Russia 2011: 4-5). The fact that the agreement was 
developed and adopted on a joint basis indicates that a network mode of 
coordination was used.  
In 2012, a schedule to monitor the implementation of the common steps was 
set. In the first progress report in December 2013, the Commission states that 
progress concerning the cooperation in border management has been made, but 
still detects shortcomings and room for improvement on both sides
24
 (Commission 
2013a: 6-7). Due to the recent crisis in the Ukraine, the EU suspended new 
negotiations on visa liberalisations with Russia (Euronews 2014).  
Although the Common Steps-Agreement was supposed to be based on 
reciprocity (i Sagrera & Potemkina 2013: 4), during the negotiations some 
discrepancies appeared: while the EU tried to convince Moscow to take more 
effective measures of border security and to enhance the control over its post-
Soviet borders, Russia put an emphasis on visa liberalization (Golunov 2013: 
126). Furthermore, the EU pointed out technical problems, whereas Russia 
believed that all technical requirements were met and accused Brussels for 
political obstacles. In this context it also appeared interesting that the EU speaks 
about ‘visa dialogue’ whereas Russia calls it ‘visa-free dialogue’ (i Sagrera & 
Potemkina 2013: 4-5). This finding weakens the first indication for a network 
coordination mode. However, although specific reciprocity is further speaking for 
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 The European countries bordering directly to Russia have for instance signed bilateral border 
management agreements with the Russian Federation. Further, multilateral cooperation occurs also 
under the framework of the Northern Dimension (e.g. Berg & Ehin 2006; Golunov 2013: 123-124, 
127ff). 
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 These steps are divided into in four blocks: 1) Document security, including biometrics, 2) 
Illegal migration, including readmission, 3) Public order, security and judicial cooperation, 4) 
External relations (EU-Russia 2011). 
24
 For instance, the reports recommends a deeper cooperation and more structured information 
exchange since data is still gathered separately leading to fragmented statistics (Commission 
2013a: 6-7) 
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hierarchical elements, the partnership seems to be based on a relative balance of 
power which is a criterion for a network mode. 
Summarizing, despite some disagreements, discrepancies and a certain lack 
of trust and mutual understanding, both partners are dependent on each other and 
possess a relative balance of power. This underlines the aforementioned 
characterization of their relationship by cooperation and competition. Hence, it 
appears difficult to clearly access their relation and thus the coordination mode in 
border control. Notwithstanding the appearance of certain hierarchical elements in 
some regards, the cooperation in border management seems to be based first and 
foremost on a network character, although this mode is clearly attenuated.  
 
Candidate Countries  
A second group of countries in the European neighbourhood are labelled as 
‘candidate countries’. According to the Commission “a country is deemed to be a 
candidate country when […] the EU Council formally recognises the country as a 
candidate, thus granting the country candidate status. Acceding countries are those 
candidate countries which have completed accession negotiations and signed an 
accession treaty with the EU” (Commission 2013d). Since the Tampere European 
Council in 1999, candidate countries are committed to adopt and implement the 
acquis (Kirisci 2007: 8). During the accession negotiations, Chapter 24 of ‘Justice, 
Freedom and Security’ covers the field of border management. 
After the latest accession of Croatia on 1 July 2013, there is no other 
acceding county at the moment. Currently the candidate countries are Iceland, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Serbia and 
Turkey. The negotiations with Turkey were opened in October 2005, whereas 
those with Iceland
25
 were opened in July 2010 and those with Montenegro in June 
2012. The negotiations with the FYROM and Serbia have not started yet 
(Commission 2013e). As all Western Balkans countries have been offered the 
prospect of an EU membership, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo
26
 
are potential candidate countries that “were promised the prospect of joining when 
they are ready” (Commission 2013e). 
In the following, the Western Balkans
27
 and Turkey are subjects to 
scrutiny
28
 regarding their cooperation with the EU in border management. Since 
the Turkish relationship with the EU differs from the EU-Western Balkans 
relation to certain extent, the two are analysed separately in sequence. 
The Western Balkans is strategically important to the EU as the region is 
geographically surrounded by EU territory. According to the Frontex Risk 
Analysis, the Western Balkans are considered a transit region for secondary 
movements of non-European migrants en route from Greece to other EU MS (cf. 
appendix 2) (Frontex 2013b: 11ff). Therefore, “the Western Balkans countries 
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 The accession negotiations of Iceland were put on hold by the Icelandic government in May 
2013 (Commission 2013e). 
26
 under the UN mandate pursuing to Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council 
27
 In the following, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FYROM, Montenegro, Kosovo and 
Serbia will be referred to as the Western Balkans.  
28
 Since Iceland is also a country of the Schengen area and shares no direct border with the EU, it 
will be examined in the model’s second level. 
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continue to be of strategic importance and of particular interest to the European 
Union” (Council 2011a: 12) leading to European efforts in strengthening the 
Western Balkans border management with the purpose of securing the EU’s 
external borders. Hereof, Collantes-Celadora and Juncos point towards a dual 
logic that guides the EU’s IBM strategy in the Western Balkans: “border 
management as a first step in the process of integrating these countries into the 
EU and as a way to defend the EU populations from external security threats” 
(Collantes-Celadora & Juncos 2012: 202). 
Since the end of the 1990s the Western Balkans countries were part of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), a long-term policy for helping states 
to tackle the challenges of reforming to democratic institutions, combating 
corruption, ethnic violence, poverty and social exclusion as well as promoting 
trade and economic development. In this context, each country of the Western 
Balkans region negotiated its ‘own’ agreement. From 2000 to 2006 the EU 
allocated EUR 4.65 billion to the regional programme “Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation” (CARDS). It contributed also to 
the strengthening of IBM (Commission 2004a: 5). The Instrument for Pre-
Accession is the successor of the CARDS programme (2014-2020) and covers the 
European assistance for border management nowadays by disposing of EUR 11.7 
billion (Commission 2014a). Since the very beginning, border management 
requirements were included in the SAP and are still regularly monitored by the 
Commission in its annual reports (Collantes-Celador & Juncos 2012: 204-206). 
These clear prescribed rules and their monitoring are a first evidence for a 
hierarchical mode of coordination. 
At the EU-Western Balkans Summit in 2003, the official start of the 
accession talks for the Western Balkans were set. Already in the so-called 
Thessaloniki Declaration, the countries committed themselves to “concrete 
measures […] to cope effectively with illegal immigration and improving border 
security and management, aiming at achieving European standards” as well as 
“strengthening administrative capacity in border control” (European Council 
2003). Furthermore, in 2004 the EU published ‘Guidelines for IBM in the 
Western Balkans’29 which were updated and clarified in January 2007. They are 
often seen as threshold criteria in terms of border management for the accession of 
the Western Balkans countries to the EU (Marenin 2010: 70).  
In this context, scholarly literature frequently stresses the fact that the EU’s 
possibilities to make third countries cooperate or adopt European objectives 
depend on the EU’s political leverage to a large extent (Monar 2012: 65). As the 
Western Balkans countries have a strong perspective of joining the EU, the 
membership prospect clearly accounts for a great European influence on the 
performance of these countries (Collantes-Celador & Juncos 2012). Accordingly, 
IBM requirements are deeply embedded in a prosperous membership 
(conditionality). This specific reciprocity is also visible in the allocation of the 
aforementioned funds. Hence, the top-down structure, asymmetric 
interdependence and specific reciprocity support the earlier finding of a hierarchy.  
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 The tripartite document functions as a framework for border management-related activities and 
provides guidance for the development of national IBM strategies for the Western Balkans 
countries (Commission 2007a). 
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Furthermore, apart from rule of law and police missions, like for instance 
EULEX which among others supports the Kosovo Border police, both Frontex 
and Europol engage and cooperate with the respective border agencies of the 
Western Balkans countries. This cooperation occurs under the framework of the 
SAP, the Guidelines and based on bilateral agreements (Collantes-Celador & 
Juncos 2012: 205-208). 
Reviewing official documents and secondary literature, a multitude of 
international actors (organisations and bilateral donors) is involved in enhancing 
IBM in the Western Balkans. As “these actors are driven by their own interests 
and priorities, which are sometimes in conflict with EU conceptions of IBM” 
(Marenin 2010: 118) coordination tends to be difficult. This however is an 
internal problem to the case of the Western Balkans and is only of marginal 
importance to the objective of this thesis. Moreover, due to space limitations, only 
the framework for the EU’s engagement in the Western Balkans in terms of 
border management was presented. Based on this framework, the EU runs 
different projects ranging from training over legal support to the funding and 
provision of IT-systems and operational equipment.  
Summarizing, the relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans is 
primarily characterized by a top-down structure and strong European leverage 
resulting in specific reciprocity and conditionality. Therefore, it is arguable that 
there is a hierarchical mode of coordination in border management between the 
EU and the Western Balkans as candidate countries. 
 
After having investigated the EU’s efforts of external border management in 
cooperation with the Western Balkans countries, the focus lays now on the 
candidate country Turkey. 
Turkey has been involved in the European integration based on the Ankara 
Association Agreement since the early 1960s. Already in 1987, the country 
applied to join the European Economic Community and was declared to be ready 
to join the EU in 1997. In 2005 the accession negotiations started but until Turkey 
agrees to apply the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement to 
Cyprus, the EU refuses to open eight negotiation chapters (Commission 2013f). 
The country is geographically significant for the EU as it is a transit point 
between three continents: Asia, Europe, and Africa. The Greek-Turkish border 
was the main crossover to illegally enter the EU for many decades, before lately 
the Bulgarian-Turkish border became one of the most used routes for crossing 
frontiers into the EU (Frontex 2013a: 13). Although the trend is decreasing, the 
Eastern Mediterranean route via the Turkish borders is still considered a main 
route of cross-border crime (cf. appendix 2). Furthermore, it is noticeable that 
Turkey is not only a country of transit but also of irregular migration and crime’s 
origin since large numbers of people, primarily from regions of Eastern Turkey, 
are trying to enter the EU illegally (Kirisci 2007: 2). These reasons make the 
country interesting for the EU’s border policy.30  
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 There are different efforts undertaken by the EU to enhance the European-Turkish border 
security by intensified operational measures of surveillance regarding for instance new technical 
surveillance systems or the Frontex operation JO Poseidon (Frontex 2013a: 21). Nonetheless, these 
are measures undertaken by the EU directly at the Turkish border which are covered in the 
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As aforementioned border management is an integral requirement of the 
accession negotiations. These conditions also apply for the Turkish endeavours for 
an EU-membership. Besides the various operational activities to enhance border 
security, in 2006 the Turkish government adopted a national action plan for a 
Turkish IBM strategy and endeavoured to harmonize the Turkish law according to 
the Schengen Convention (Kirisci 2007: 2-10). However, in a report in 2012, the 
Commission claimed that there is only limited progress in strengthening the 
Turkish IBM (Sert 2013: 178).  
In 2013, the EU concluded a ‘roadmap towards a visa-free regime with 
Turkey’ similar to the above-outlined visa-dialogue with Russia, also including a 
section concerning border management. Nevertheless, an important difference 
between the Russian and the Turkish negotiations is that the Russian ‘roadmap’ 
was developed on a joint basis with requirements for both sides, whereas the 
chapter on IBM in the visa dialogue with Ankara states that “Turkey should fulfill 
the following requirements […]” (EU 2013b: 7). Thus, the document’s wording 
indicates a top-down structure pointing towards a hierarchy in coordination.  
The hierarchical indication is reinforced by the fact that the Turkish efforts 
to create a border management system according to European standards are also 
supported by the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (Commission 2014a). 
This suggests a dependency on European funding and would support the argument 
of a hierarchal relation. Nonetheless, one has to recognize that Turkey itself 
invests a large amount of money in the modernisation of its border control system 
(Kirisci 2007: 21-22). 
Notwithstanding that the EU’s conditionality achieved success for Turkey in 
strengthening its border control; Kirisci (2007: 2-3) identified some “reluctance” 
by the Turkish authorities to cooperate with the EU in all matters of border 
management. This is considered to derive primarily from the economic, political 
and administrative costs of a more modern border system. Furthermore, since the 
last decade, Turkey achieved a lot of progress and can be regarded a regional 
power as it is not dependent on the EU as other neighbouring countries. Thus, 
compared to the other candidate countries, Turkey is in a somewhat stronger 
position to ‘revolt’ against the EU’s conditionality. Thus although there are still 
many asymmetries, the Turkish-EU relationship can nowadays be considered to 
be based on a certain balance of power which weakens the initial argument of a 
hierarchy.  
Moreover, the EU-Turkish relationship is increasingly overshadowed by 
mistrust and dwindling credibility of the EU. Kirisci (2007: 6-8, 27) stresses that 
many Turkish officials start losing trust into a prospectus membership as the EU 
is not clear about Turkey’s accession and keeps suspending the talks on eight 
chapters. Consequently, this affects the ‘effectiveness’ and leverage of the 
accession agreement’s conditionality to a large extent. As border management is 
an integral part of this agreement, the Turkish motivation for adopting European 
standards is decreasing. This development clearly undermines the EU’s position 
                                                                                                                                                               
model’s third level. Thus, this first level concentrates on measures of border management in 
cooperation with the third country, in this case Turkey. 
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in the top-down structure, weakens conditionality and thus the hierarchical way of 
cooperation.  
Nevertheless, the EU is aware of the importance of a good relationship and 
secure European-Turkish borders as Turkey is a direct link to the instable regions 
of the Middle East. Furthermore, despite the costs of an IBM modernisation, 
Turkish officials also see the benefits for Turkey’s security (Kirisci 2007: 20-22). 
Hence, the increasing power of Turkey and the geographical location results in an 
ever more symmetric interdependency.  
Summarizing, there are clear elements of hierarchy in the EU-Turkish 
relationship in border management, especially considering the conditionality of 
the accession agreement. However, during the last decades, Turkey went through 
an extensive change and is not that depended on the EU anymore. Furthermore, 
decreasing trust and dependency further weakens the EU’s leverage. Nevertheless, 
both the EU and Turkey are interested in effective and secure borders. Taking all 
aspects together, the EU’s efforts of border management in cooperation with 
Turkey are characterized by a severely weakened hierarchy.  
 
Drawing an interim conclusion, the EU’s relation in border management 
towards its candidate countries differs. While there is an almost clear hierarchal 
form of coordination in the case of the Western Balkans, the picture is more 
differentiated in the case of Turkey. Although the latter also enjoys candidate 
status, the EU-Turkish relationship in terms of border security tends to be more on 
an equal level than the European relation with the Western Balkans leading to a 
more attenuated form of hierarchical coordination.  
 
Countries of the ENP  
A last group of countries in the European neighbourhood consists of those 
participating in the ENP. The ENP was initiated in 2004 with the objectives of 
enhancing cooperation in political and security matters and to support social-
economic development without the prospect of an EU-membership (Commission 
2004b). In its ENP strategy paper, the Commission already considered border 
management as “a priority” (Commission 2004b: 16) by stressing that “the goal 
should be to facilitate movement of persons, whilst maintaining or improving a 
high level of security” (Commission 2004b: 17). 
Currently, there are 16 countries involved in the ENP. 12 countries
31
 are 
fully participating in the programme whereas Belarus, Libya and Syria remain 
outside most of the ENP structures and Algeria is negotiating an ENP action plan 
at the moment. Although the ENP was primarily composed as a bilateral policy, it 
is complemented by three regional and multilateral cooperation initiatives: the 
Eastern Partnership, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as well as the Black Sea 
Synergy (EEAS 2014a). The riots in the course of the Arab Spring and the 
ongoing civil war in Syria led to an increasing number of migrants trying to 
illegally pass the EU’s external borders. As the ENP countries are countries of 
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 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, 
Tunisia, Ukraine 
 32 
 
both origin and transit of irregular migration, it became even more important for 
the EU to cooperate with these countries in terms of border control.  
The ENP includes different projects and initiatives to support the 
beneficiary countries in obtaining the required reforms in border management. 
Besides financial support, the EU provides a wide range of instruments like 
equipment, training or technical expertise. Furthermore, one important instrument 
is the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM). Currently there is one of these 
missions to Moldova and Ukraine which was launched in 2005 and will 
presumably last until 2015. The mission involves advice by customs and border 
police experts from the EU MS under a total annual budget of EUR 12 million 
(Monar 2012: 62; UNDP 2012). In course of the Arab Spring, another significant 
mission was established in May 2013: EUBAM Libya. EUBAM Libya is a 
civilian mission under the CFSP with the mandate to support the country in 
improving and developing the security of its borders. The mission responds to an 
invitation by Libya and has an annual budget of around EUR 30 million (EEAS 
2014b). 
The EU’s projects of its ENP are currently financed by a new European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
32
. From 2014 to 2020, it shall dispose of EUR 
15.4 billion (enpi-info 2014). Thereby, the financial support is based on the 
principle of ‘more-for-more’, meaning that ENI is “incentive-based and 
differentiated in forms and amounts” (enpi-info 2014.). Hence, the EU grants 
extra financial support to those countries of the ENP that show improvements and 
reforms. The support is then based on an annually ENP Progress Report published 
by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission (EEAS 
2014a). The top-down structure, conditionality and monitoring of the compliance 
indicate at a first glance a hierarchical mode of coordination.  
This first impression of a hierarchy is however weakened, considering that 
the EU’s “interdependence in relation with the ENP countries is strongly 
asymmetric, with the EU having much stronger interests in cooperation with most 
aspects of JHA than its neighbours” (Lavenex 2010: 85). This goes in line with 
the argumentation by Monar (2012: 65) who noted that since the ENP countries 
do not have the incentive of an EU-membership the EU’s leverage is not as 
powerful as it is concerning its candidate countries.  
The support of each participating country is based on bilateral action plans, 
PCAs or association agreements. According to Baracini (2009: 136) the ENP 
action plans are very similar to the accession partnerships of the candidate 
countries since both contain a set of priorities and required reforms that have to be 
fulfilled to receive benefits from the EU. Nevertheless, one difference is that the 
ENP agreements are not unilaterally ‘imposed’ by the Council but jointly agreed 
between the EU and the ENP country. This “allows the EU to promote only those 
political reforms that the ENP partner is willing to make” (Baracini 2009: 137). 
Accordingly, while the conditionality to fulfil the requirements to receive 
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 ENI is the successor of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. In 2012 alone, 
the budget for cross-border cooperation “including fight against organised crime and ensuring 
secure borders” under the ENPI amounted Euro 92.8 million (Monar 2012: 61). Additionally, EUR 
1.2439 billion were allocated for capacity building in JHA issues in the EuroMed countries and 
EUR 728.4 million for the same purpose to the Eastern Partnership (Monar 2012: 61). 
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financial support indicates a hierarchical structure between the EU and the ENP 
countries, the latter finding points more towards a network coordination. 
Moreover, the EU launched different training projects regarding border 
security in cooperation with the respective ENP countries. One example is the 
‘Eastern Partnership – IBM Flagship Initiative’ that started in the beginning of 
2010 and provides training in border control and guidance to the participating 
countries (EaP IBM 2012). The project reveals important elements of a network 
mode of coordination such as shared mutual interests and no notable top-down 
structures. This is primarily due to the fact that the core idea of this project is the 
exchange of best practices and the support by European experts rather than the 
allocation of funds. 
Summarizing, although the ENP countries lack the incentive of an EU-
membership and have a voice in negotiating the agreements, there are still 
elements of conditionality. Furthermore, these countries see the needs in 
strengthening their border management for improving the prosperity and security 
of their own country. Accordingly, the ENP countries rely on the EU’s financial 
support, expertise and good relations with the EU also regarding trade and further 
aid. Taking this into account, the cooperation and coordination between the EU 
and the ENP countries in border management is primarily characterized by an 
attenuated hierarchy.   
 
5.1.1.2 Measures in cooperation with international organizations  
 
Apart from the afore-outlined cooperation with third countries, the EU 
works closely together with different international organisations in terms of 
border management. 
The aforementioned Stockholm Programme confirmed the EU’s 
commitment and importance of European cooperation in and with international 
organizations. Thereby the UN was named as “the most important international 
organisation for the Union” (European Council 2010: 37). Accordingly, the EU 
cooperates with different UN offices concerning European border management. 
The most frequent collaboration occurs with the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC). As this UN office is responsible for fighting illicit drugs 
and international crime it shares the EU’s concern for secure borders. One 
instance is the cooperation in improving border control in the Western Balkans. 
Besides of collaboration in risk analysis, capacity building, training and 
information exchange as well as mutual consultation, Frontex and UNODC jointly 
work on building the capacity of border control personnel based on a working 
agreement from April 2012 (UNODC 2014). 
Apart from the cooperation with the UNODC, the EU also cooperates with 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP is interested in 
a strong border management as this is considered to be inevitably for national and 
regional stability and for economic growth. One particular example of cooperation 
to secure the EU’s external borders directly is the aforementioned EUBAM 
mission to Moldova and Ukraine. While the mission is fully funded by the EU, the 
implementation is conducted jointly by the EU and UNDP (UNDP 2012).  
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Another important international organisation the EU cooperates with in IBM 
is the IOM. Nowadays, the organization is considered a major source of 
intelligence, advice, assessment and technical assistance regarding border policies 
and practice (Andrijasevic & Walters 2010: 979). According to the IOM itself, it 
“assist[s] governments in meeting their migration's operational challenges” and in 
“creat[ing] policy, legislation, administrative structures, operational systems and 
the human resource base necessary to respond effectively to diverse migration and 
border challenges and to institute appropriate migration governance” (IOM n.d.). 
The organization is a key implementing partner for the EU since the late 1990s 
and is funded by the EU MS and the Commission to a large extent (IOM 2012; 
Weinar 2011: 10). 
In the course of its support for border management, the IOM draws on the 
EU’s IBM strategy and often cooperates with Frontex, the EEAS and the 
Commission (IOM 2012). One significant example of cooperation between the 
EU and IOM is a project in the Western Balkans and Turkey covering several 
aspects of IBM. Besides training and the provision of expertise, a forum for the 
national Heads of Border Services was established with the purpose to exchange 
information and strategies on the management of border posts. The project is 
funded by the Commission with EUR 2.5 million (IOM 2011). 
A third important partner organization in securing the EU’s external borders 
is Interpol. The International Criminal Police Organization’s main task is to 
support the police cooperation of MS worldwide. In 2012 the Commissioner for 
JHA Cecilia Malmström named Interpol as a “key partner” in securing the EU’s 
external borders. In this context, Interpol established an Integrated Border 
Management Task Force to centralize their border management efforts and to 
“enhance[e] the capacity of border security in member countries” (Interpol 2014). 
Coordination is, among others, ensured by the secondment of a Special 
Representative of Interpol to the EU (Interpol 2012). The cooperation in border 
management between the EU (primarily Frontex and Europol) and Interpol consist 
primarily of the access to databases and exchange of information and training 
(Interpol 2013). Thereby, the work of the European agencies and Interpol is 
complementary (Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). 
Concluding, the EU cooperates with different international organizations in 
securing its external borders. However, the scope and type of cooperation varies. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the EU and the international organizations 
can generally be characterized as a network due to the presence of a common 
interest in strengthening IBM and a diffuse reciprocity. Additionally, the 
cooperation is based on the assumption that the EU and the respective 
international organization are equal partners based on bilateral joint agreements 
without conditionality.  
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5.1.1.3 Summary level one  
 
The first level of the thesis’ analysis clearly demonstrated that the mode of 
coordination depends on the actors’ relationship. Thus, as the EU’s relation 
towards the stakeholders varies different coordination modes are recognizable in 
this level of border management as it can be seen in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Summary of the modes of coordination in level one 
 
Case Mode of coordination 
Third country without geographical connection 
USA  Network 
Third country in the EU’s neighbourhood 
Russia (Strategic partner) Attenuated network  
Western Balkans  
(Candidate countries) 
Hierarchy 
Turkey (Candidate country) Attenuated hierarchy  
ENP countries Attenuated hierarchy  
International organisations 
UNODC, UNDP, IOM and 
Interpol 
Network 
 
Considering however the multiple types of stakeholders the EU cooperates 
with, the different policies and measures themselves do not seem to be interlinked 
within this first level. Nonetheless, they can still be regarded complementary in 
their purpose to ensure the security of the EU’s external frontiers.  
Moreover, it appears difficult to determine where exactly the overall 
responsibility for coordinating European border management with the third actors 
lays. Reviewing the first level, the Commission is primarily responsible for 
implementing and monitoring the agreements concluded by the Council, whereas 
Frontex
33
 concludes working agreements with the third actors and supports 
European operational efforts with and within the EU’s neighbourhood. Moreover, 
the EU-Delegations are supposed to support the coordination between 
Commission and Council initiatives (Collantes-Celadora & Juncos 2012: 207). 
Nevertheless, referring to Marenin (2010: 116), IBM in cooperation with 
stakeholders outside the EU involves “three policy domains: community, member 
states and a common foreign policy” and thereby reflects the “reality that only 
limited agreement exists on who has authority over what policy”. 
 
 
5.1.2 Level two: Measures of cooperation within the Schengen area 
 
After having investigated the EU’s efforts of securing its external borders in 
cooperation with third actors, the following section focuses on the second level of 
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 Frontex role as a European agency for coordinating EU member states’ operational activities is 
regarded in level three (Chapter 5.1.3). 
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the altered four-level model of border management. This level contains the 
cooperation within the Schengen area
34
 and thus cooperation with the non-EU 
Schengen states.  
The core of the Schengen area is the abolishment of internal border controls 
between the participating states which makes a close cooperation to manage the 
common frontiers inevitable. The cooperation is regulated in the Schengen 
Catalogue that entails two parts: external border control as well as return and 
readmission (Council 2009: 6). The Catalogue’s first part is most interesting for 
this study as it covers a set of rules concerning external border checks, police 
cooperation and cross-border surveillance (Commission 2013g; Kaczorowska 
2008: 32-34).  
The Schengen area
35
 consists of nearly all EU MS as well as Iceland, 
Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. The UK and Ireland are not part of the 
Schengen agreement, whereas Denmark only opted out of some parts. Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus and Rumania are not yet part of the area of free movement
36
 (cf. 
appendix 3). However, these countries are still considered in this chapter as they 
participate in many aspects of the Schengen cooperation and have a joint interest 
in an effective external border control. Nonetheless, this second level focuses on 
the EU’s cooperation and coordination with the four associated countries. 
Iceland and Norway are two of the non-EU members of the Schengen 
cooperation. Their association with the Schengen area dates back to December 
1996 and was extended with the implementation of the Schengen acquis based on 
a Council Decision and a renewed agreement in 1999. In 2001 the abolishment of 
border checks was introduced (EU 2009; Europaportalen 2013). 
Due to its location, Switzerland was already economically deeply integrated 
into the common market and had concluded various agreements on police and 
border cooperation (Wichmann 2009). In 2004, Switzerland became an associated 
country of the Schengen area. This association was confirmed by a Swiss 
referendum in 2005 and the internal borders were officially abolished in 2008. 
Liechtenstein’s participation in the Schengen area is regulated in a protocol signed 
in 2008 which entered into force in 2011 (EU 2009).  
All four associated countries were already involved in European border 
security through bilateral agreements before they became members of the 
Schengen area. Nowadays, the four countries have an even stronger interest in 
cooperating with the EU to secure the external borders as these countries are 
linked to the external frontiers through the area of free movement created by the 
Schengen agreement. This mutual interest already indicates a symmetric 
interdependency (cf. Wichmann 2009: 657-658).  
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the framework of the Schengen agreement. Apart from the one cooperation that is clearly labelled 
as ‘Schengen cooperation’, the non-EU Schengen members frequently collaborate with the EU in 
other means of border management (cf. Chapter 5.1.3 and 5.2). 
35
 The historical development of the Schengen area was briefly outlined in Chapter 2.3. For a more 
detailed presentation please consult Karanja (2008). 
36
 New member states have to fulfil particular pre-conditions and requirements and to undergo a 
‘Schengen evaluation’ to join the Schengen area (Commission 2013g). 
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Regarding the formal cooperation, the establishment of the Mixed 
Committee
37
 enables all four associated members to participate in the Schengen 
cooperation. The Committee’s meetings take place in the margins of the Council 
meetings (Norwegian Mission to the EU n.d.). Nevertheless, due to the facts that 
no votes are taken in the Mixed Committee (Kaczorowska 2008: 32) and the four 
associated members do not possess any voting rights the Council, some scholars 
tend to argue that the influence of the associated countries in the political 
machinery is rather limited (e.g. Wichmann 2009: 671-673). Notwithstanding, 
they are still considered influential in the decision-shaping process and in the 
drafting of new legal instruments due to several factors. First of all, the absence of 
voting rights in the Council is tempered by the fact that voting is rare and 
decisions usually are taken by consensus (Wichmann 2009: 671; Interview Swiss 
DEA 02.05.2014). Moreover, the non-EU Schengen countries are allowed to 
participate in all relevant Council working groups (WGs) and Commission’s 
committee meetings (Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). In this context, the 
Commission is further obliged to consult experts and the governments of the 
associated Schengen members the same way than it does with EU members 
(Europaportalen 2013). Therefore, although the four countries do not have voting 
rights in the Council, they are still able to influence and shape the development of 
the Schengen acquis.  
Practical cooperation, based on the Schengen Convention, takes place in 
several forms such as joint training, common techniques or arrangements in police 
cooperation. One example for joint training is the Operation Perkunas, an 
information-gathering exercise for the purpose of detecting the link between 
irregular external border crossings and secondary movements within the Schengen 
area. 23 EU MS as well as Norway and Switzerland participated in the operation 
carried out from 30 September to 13 October 2013 (Commission 2013b: 3). As 
the training seemed to occur on a reciprocal level, the indication of an equal 
relationship between the EU and the associated countries especially in operational 
terms is stressed. This finding was confirmed in an interview with the Swiss DEA 
(02.05.2014).  
Another more known mean of border protection is the Schengen 
Information System (SIS), a computerised system for exchanging information 
about missing or wanted persons or items with a request for action. It functions as 
a basis for other measures of external border control. Thus, the SIS shall 
counterbalance the abolishment of internal border checks and is considered the 
“most important compensatory measure” (Karanja 2008: 56). The MS receive and 
supply information via national SIS which are connected to the central SIS 
online
38
 (Kaczorowska 2008: 33). Additionally, all border-crossing points of the 
Schengen external frontiers are equipped with SIS terminals for checking 
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 The Mixed Committee consists of the EU-member states, representatives of the Commission and 
associated Schengen countries (Norwegian Mission to the EU n.d.). 
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 Within the SIS, data exchange can also be carried out directly from one national SIS to another 
via the Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries (SIRENE) system. For this 
purpose, every Schengen state maintains one office responsible for SIRENE which is available at 
any time. The offices are connected through a telecommunication network called SISNET 
(Kaczorowska 2008: 33). 
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concerned persons (Karanja 2008: 381). The initial system was established in 
1995. It was updated by a second generation (SIS II) which was introduced by a 
Commission Communication in 2001 and came into force in April 2013. The 
costs for the new system accounted around EUR 168 million and were paid partly 
by the EU and partly by the associated states (Swiss DEA 2013). The burden-
sharing and the fact that all states have the same access to the SIS underline the 
equal standing in cooperation.  
At this point an interconnection to the first level is recognizable as Interpol 
complements the cooperation between the Schengen countries and also draws 
back on the SIS (Swiss DEA 2013). However, it appears interesting that in the 
SIRENE system “Schengen alerts take precedence over Interpol alerts” (Council 
2011b: 9). 
Finally, reviewing the cooperation within the Schengen area and the EU’s 
relationship to the associated countries, all criteria for a network mode are present. 
This thesis argues that all participating states have a mutual interest in securing 
their common frontiers after the abolishment of the internal border checks. 
Accordingly, their interests are reciprocal and they rely on each other which is 
leading to a symmetric interdependency. Regarding the actual cooperation in 
securing the common external borders, there was no indication of a difference in 
the treatment between EU and associated states. Furthermore, a diffuse reciprocity 
became visible as there is no immediate and exactly equivalent reciprocation of 
each concession. 
Alone the fact that the associated members are not allowed to vote in the 
Council and Council WGs over Schengen developments weakens this picture of a 
network to a certain extent. Nonetheless, there might formally be differences 
between the EU and associated states, but in practice all Schengen members are 
alike (cf. Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). This is illustrated by the fact that all 
countries are equally allowed to discuss and shape new developments of the 
Schengen acquis. Moreover, no elements of conditionality were present due to the 
reciprocal interests, a relative balance of power and the fact that these countries 
currently do not pursue an EU membership
39
. Therefore, it is arguable that 
cooperation and coordination of the EU with the associated states within the 
framework of the Schengen acquis is determined by a network mode.  
 
5.1.3 Level three: Measures of border control directly by the EU 
 
The focus of the following chapter shall be the efforts of IBM undertaken by 
the EU at the European external frontiers directly (level three). 
Generally speaking, the EU’s border management is based on the principle 
of solidarity. Hence, the MS are controlling their borders not only for themselves 
but also for the other members as they are interlinked through the area of free 
movements (Council 2009: 8). Nonetheless, principally every MS is responsible 
for its own frontiers making the EU’s IBM policy only binding to a limited extent 
(Hobbing & Koslowski 2009: 9; Interview German FMI 16.05.2014). 
Accordingly, many border security measures are undertaken autonomously by the 
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 Except for Iceland, but the Icelandic government has put the talks on hold.  
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MS
40
. However, this thesis investigates joint efforts of IBM by the EU. In this 
regard, many European endeavours are meant to coordinate MS’ action because 
the EU itself does not dispose of operational assets (Council 2006: 11).   
Based on literature review and information from the interviews (Swiss DEA 
02.05.2014, German FMI 16.05.2014), coordination of IBM on European level 
can be divided into strategic and operational coordination. Thereby, the best 
known agency responsible for the EU’s operational border control is Frontex. As 
its full name
41
 implies, Frontex’ mandate is to coordinate the cooperation between 
the MS and to “improve the integrated management of the external borders of the 
European Union” (EU 2010b)42. Based on risk analysis, Frontex initiates and 
coordinates joint missions as well as acts as forum for information exchange 
(Interview Frontex 16.05.2014). The associated Schengen countries as well as 
third countries of the EU neighbourhood may participate in Frontex coordinated 
missions based on framework agreements (Interviews Frontex 16.05.2014, Swiss 
DEA 02.05.2014). Nonetheless, the agency’s primary focus lies on the EU MS.  
Due to its legal status as a European body, Frontex is able to act relatively 
autonomous (Kasparek 2013). The agency is represented by an executive director 
and governed by a Managing Board that is tasked to control the functions of the 
agency. This board consists of one representative from each MS
43
 and two 
Commission representatives. Besides of its presence in the Managing Board, the 
Commission maintains a political link to Frontex as it “guides the agency on the 
state of affairs in Council” (Carrera 2007: 13). The facts that all EU MS enjoy the 
same rights under the framework of Frontex and share mutual interests indicate a 
network mode of coordination.  
Additionally, the EU developed different operational mechanisms to mange 
its external borders. EUROSUR can be named as one surveillance system using 
for instance earth observation satellites or unmanned aerial vehicles. Furthermore, 
it enables “near real-time sharing of border-related data between members of the 
network” (Frontex 2014b). 
Regarding the more formal strategic IBM coordination, the Standing 
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) within the 
Council (Council 2010c: Article 1) attracts attention. It was established by a 
Council Decision in 2010 and is tasked to “ensure that operational cooperation on 
internal security is promoted and strengthened within the Union” (Article 71 
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 These independent or bilateral measures and policies of border management by the member 
states would be part of fourth level of the four-level model which will not be regarded in this thesis 
due to the above-outlined reasons. 
41
 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
the Member States of the European Union 
42
 Apart from training and risk analysis, Frontex has the possibility to launch a joint operation or to 
deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) consisting of operational assets of member 
states in case of severe threats at an external border (Council 2009: 15). Furthermore, the agency 
assists and coordinates different ‘subnetworks’ for border control such as the European Patrols 
Network, a multi-agency approach functioning as “backbone” for Frontex-coordinated joint 
operations at sea (Frontex 2014a). 
43
 The UK and Ireland may participate but have no voting rights (Frontex 2014a).  Furthermore, 
the four associated Schengen states are allowed to participate at the board’s meetings but retain 
only limited voting rights regarding issues that concern operational aspects of Schengen 
cooperation (Frontex 2014a; Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). 
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TEFU). The high-level committee, consisting of competent members of the 
national ministries and the Commission, is responsible for all matters of internal 
security. Nonetheless, the Internal Security Strategy (Council 2010a: 13) specifies 
the mandate “to ensure effective coordination and cooperation between law-
enforcement and border-management authorities”. Based on this, it shall advise 
the Council regarding operational cooperation and evaluate the IBM’s general 
direction and efficiency (Council 2010c). Nonetheless, the committee is not 
allowed to conduct operations or prepare legislative acts by itself (Council 2010c: 
Articles 4, 6). Article 71 TFEU regulates that COSI has to inform the Council and 
EP about its activities. Generally, the establishment of COSI shall support the 
coordination and information transfer to the national governments via the Council 
and establish consistency between the European agencies (Council 2010c).  
Moreover, the IBM relevant Council WGs need to be considered. The WGs 
compose the ‘lowest level’ in the JHA decision-making structure and tasked to 
prepare new legislation by coordinating the MS’s positions in IBM (Lavenex 
2010: 464; Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014 and German FMI 16.05.2014).  
In this regard the ‘External Border Practitioners’ Common Unit’ 
(SCIFA+)
44
, a special WG tasked with strategic coordination, is worth 
mentioning. Composed of senior officials, it functions as a forum for MS to 
exchange information in the fields of asylum, immigration and borders 
(Commission 2014b). The SCIFA+ may invite Frontex to its meetings (Interview 
Frontex 16.05.2014). Furthermore, the Schengen associated members may also 
participate in meetings with Schengen related topics (Interview Swiss DEA 
02.05.2014). Beside coordinating national undertaking 
45
 and overseeing EU-wide 
pilot projects on border control, it establishes strategic guidelines and 
recommendations before the issues are handed over to COREPER and finally to 
the Council, including COSI (Council 2006: 11). 
These institutional bodies responsible for the strategic coordination in 
European IBM clearly feature a top-down structure. The coordination between 
them is embedded in the hierarchical structure but also ensured through the 
Commission and the respective Council presidency that preside the meetings. By 
setting strategic priorities, the Council presidency is able to ensure that all bodies 
work in the same direction (Interview German FMI 16.05.2014). 
Beside their legal status, the scope of Frontex and the institutional bodies’ 
mandate differs. More in detail, Frontex is responsible for the coordination of 
operational cooperation, whereas COSI, SCIFA and the other WGs are tasked to 
coordinate cooperation more formally by strategic deliberations and preparations 
for decision-making in IBM. Furthermore, while Frontex’ work focuses solely on 
border control, the institutional bodies deal with frontiers as only one aspect of the 
EU’s internal security. Notwithstanding the differences, the cooperation and 
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 The SCIFA+ consists of members of SCIFA and heads of national border control services and is 
a formation within the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) 
(Interview Swiss DEA 2014; Lavenex 2010: 464). 
45
 These national measures by member states would be part of level four. As this thesis is looking 
at common EU action, this last level will be omitted (cf. Chapter 4.2). 
 41 
 
relations of the MS in the discussed bodies can be described as equal
46
 and 
determined by symmetric interdependencies and diffuse reciprocity.  
At this point it appears essential to mention the role of the EU institutions in 
border management. First of all, a “lead function” (Lavenex 2010: 464) is 
exercised by the European Council based on its strategic programming
47
 (Article 
68 TFEU). The next significant actor is the Council, especially in its JHA 
formation. As the Lisbon Treaty determines the entire scope of JHA as a shared 
competence, the EP is involved in the legislative process through the ordinary 
legislative procedure (Article 77(2) TFEU). Furthermore, the Commission enjoys 
the right of initiative, monitors the implementation and is involved in operational 
measures (Council 2006: 11; Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). Based on 
literature, the involvement of the EU institutions supports the finding of a network 
mode as they offer a stable membership, an equal standing of the MS, symmetric 
interdependencies and mutual interests. It confirms the above-outlined 
argumentation of scholars for a network character in the EU (e.g. Jordan & Schout 
2008; Jönsson & Strömvik 2005). 
Concluding the third level, “[t]he management of the EU’s external borders 
is based on the principles of solidarity, mutual trust and co-responsibility of the 
Member States” (Council 2006: 5). This is supported by this chapter’s impression 
of an equal relationship between the EU and the MS in common European action 
of border control. The fact that the EU established different means for burden 
sharing (Marenin 2010: 14) and that all MS have the same rights in the European 
institutions and bodies as well as cooperate jointly in different means underlines 
that finding further. Additionally, besides the equality aspect, all other criteria for 
a network mode are fulfilled as the EU MS’ relationship is based on diffuse 
reciprocity and a mutual interest in securing their common frontiers. 
Regarding the relationship between the bodies entrusted with the 
coordination in IBM and the European institutions, indications for a hierarchy in 
their internal coordination, such as clear rules and a top-down structure, became 
visible. Nevertheless, this finding is weakened as they also share mutual interests 
and interdependencies. 
 
 
5.2 The vertical dimension 
 
 
After having scrutinized the horizontal dimension, the following chapter 
concentrates on the vertical dimension. Therefore, this analysis’ second part 
builds on the afore-acquired knowledge to answer the second sub-question: “How 
are the different levels of border management interconnected and coordinated?”. 
Reviewing the examined levels of border management, various measures of 
European border control were identified. Thereby, the efforts undertaken by the 
EU in one level seem to be conducted rather independently from the other levels 
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 This finding was supported by all interviewees (cf. Interviews Frontex 16.05.2014, German FMI 
16.05.2014 and Swiss DEA 02.05.2014) 
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 For example the Tampere, The Hague and Stockholm programmes (please see Chapter 2.3.). 
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at first glance. This is supporting the argumentation put forward by scholars of 
IBM being a fragmented policy area (cf. Berg & Ehin 2006). Nevertheless, the 
measures and policies of the four levels can be regarded complementary and 
interlinked through the responsible European actors.   
Generally, considering the relationship between the different levels of 
border management, the strongest links seem to occur between the last three 
levels. In this regard, level three and four are interconnected through COSI and 
SCIFA which coordinate projects of the MS. Moreover, European legislation 
decided upon in level three needs to be implemented in national law and also 
applied to national actions of border control (level four). Additionally, the MS are 
using the shared databases of Frontex (level three) but also data retrieved for 
instance from SIS (level two) for national measures (level four).  
Next, level two and three are also closely interlinked as the abolishment of 
internal borders within the Schengen area created a mutual interest in securing the 
external borders. This close interconnection and relationship is illustrated by the 
associated Schengen states’ frequent participation in the second level of European 
border management. Thereby, the associated Schengen countries may participate 
in formal
48
 and in operational means.  
Notwithstanding that level one appears to be to some extent outside of the 
close relationship between the EU MS, common European action and associated 
Schengen countries, the cooperation with third actors is still regarded significant 
for an effective European IBM. Thus, the first level’s most intensive 
interconnection can be seen with level three. In this regard, compared to the 
efforts by the EU to establish European standards of IBM in its neighbourhood, 
cooperation with countries that are not geographically connected to the EU occurs 
primarily through the exchange of information. Regarding the European 
neighbourhood, the EU aims at enhancing and strengthening their border 
management with the consent of the respective states. Furthermore, based on 
working agreements, the neighbouring countries may also participate in joint EU 
missions.
49
 Occasionally, international organisations take part in such actions as 
well. Among the involvement of the European institutions with the third actors, 
especially the appearance of Frontex and the Commission is noticeable. 
Furthermore, the Schengen associated countries (level two) are also involved in 
European action (level three) in and with the countries neighbouring the EU (level 
one). Despite the thesis’s aim of investigating into common European endeavours 
of IBM, it appears necessary to mention that there is also an interconnection 
between level one and four through bilateral agreements and measures by EU MS 
with third actors. 
As previously mentioned, the presence of Frontex stands out as it is visible 
in each level. This was already noted by Carrera (2007: 27) expressing that 
Frontex is the “main institutional actor in charge of putting the integrated and 
global paradigm into practice”. Hence, through working agreements with actors in 
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 In this regard, it is important to note that the formal participation is restricted to matters that 
concern the Schengen area. Further, the associated countries only have limited voting rights in the 
third level’s institutions and bodies. 
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 Only those third countries outside the EU participate in EU joint missions that have signed a 
respective agreement with Frontex (Interview with Frontex 16.05.2014). 
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level one, the involvement of the associated Schengen members in Frontex’ 
Managing Board and in common missions (level two), the coordination of MS’ 
joint operations (level three) and lastly through the assistance of the EU MS’ 
actions (level four), Frontex interlinks all four levels. 
Apart from the strong involvement of Frontex, the Commission contributes 
to the picture of interconnection by implementing and monitoring policies in all 
levels supplemented by its right of initiative. Accordingly, different Commission 
Directorate-Generals (DGs) are involved. As border management falls primarily 
within JHA, DG Home Affairs is the most frequently concerned department, 
especially in levels two and three. Nonetheless this DG can also be recognized as 
being part of level one as it is further mandated to deal with borders regarding the 
EU neighbourhood and strategic partners like the USA and Russia (Commission 
2013j). Apart from the DG Home Affairs, the DGs External Relations (RELEX) 
and Enlargement are involved in the first level as well. 
Another European institution that appears to be a present in all four levels is 
the Council. Apart from the above outlined legislative competence (level three, 
four) this intergovernmental body signs international agreements (level one) on 
behalf of the EU. The associated Schengen members (level two) may also 
participate in respective Council WGs (level three).  
Due to the abovementioned ordinary legislative procedure, the EP is also 
involved in the legislative process between the levels. The decisions taken in level 
three have to be implemented into national law and thus need to be applied to 
national action in level four. Moreover, the associated countries (level two) are 
affected by Schengen related acts. The EP’s role in the first level is primarily to 
approve or reject (international) agreements negotiated by the EU in the consent 
procedure (Article 289(2) TFEU).  
Considering the diversity of actors and policies in European border 
management, scholars generally stressed the importance of so-called ‘linking-pin 
organizations’ that “occupy central positions in terms of being reachable from, 
and able to reach” most of the actors in the system (Jönsson 1986: 42). Thus, 
linking-pin organizations are often regarded as communication channel and 
broker, although they might have self-interests (Jönsson 1986: 43).   
Considering the overarching presence of Frontex, it is arguable that this 
agency acts as a linking-pin organization. This is stressed by the fact that Frontex 
possesses a central position within the European IBM, centres all activities and 
coordinates the operations. Moreover, it links European border control to third 
parties, which is another significant characteristic of a linking-pin organization 
(Jönsson 1986: 43).  
Furthermore, Jönsson and Strömvik (2005: 18) observe that the Commission 
is usually noted as a linking-pin in European politics. This can also be the case in 
IBM due to the Commission’s central role and its interconnection with all levels, 
especially with regards to initiating new legislation, monitoring and implementing 
the EU’s strategies in the neighbouring countries and at MS level. Marenin (2010: 
9) even speaks of a “lead responsibility” in IBM. Thus, while Frontex merely 
links the levels in operational and practical means, the Commission can also be 
considered a linking-pin organization in terms of legislative and formal 
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interconnection. Accordingly, the Commission can further be characterized as a 
“process manager” (Kohler-Koch 1996: 368).  
Nonetheless, it appears difficult to distinguish one actor that holds the main 
responsibility for the whole coordination between the different levels of border 
management, as it was already concluded in the first level’s summary.  
After having scrutinized the relationship between the levels of border 
management, the impression arises that the most present mode of coordination in 
the vertical dimension is a network form. This is notably the case among the last 
three layers, primarily due to the fact that in these levels the involved stakeholders 
share mutual interests and social patterns. Furthermore, their cooperation is based 
on trust and on a relative balance of power. Accordingly, the interconnection 
among the levels two, three and four showed no evidence of conditionality or a 
top-down structure which appeared to be one of the most crucial indicators for 
hierarchical coordination. Considering this, the relation between level one and 
three varied to a great extent. As level one involves diverse types of third actors, 
the EU’s relationship towards them differed. Consequently, the interconnection 
between level one and three offered both hierarchical and network modes of 
coordination as well as hybrid forms. Thereby it was noticeable that the first 
level’s relation towards level two, which primarily involves practical 
collaboration, is characterized by a network mode of coordination owing to the 
fact that the Schengen countries have no leverage on the EU’s neighbourhood.  
Concluding, these observations support the earlier findings and 
argumentation that the actors’ relationship determines the particular mode of 
coordination. Thereby, the linking-pin role of Frontex and the Commission was 
stressed.  
 
 
5.3 Merging the horizontal and vertical dimension of 
European border management 
 
 
After having scrutinized both the horizontal and vertical dimension of IBM, 
the following section briefly summarizes and compares the findings related to the 
mode of coordination (cf. appendix 4). 
Regarding the horizontal dimension, the study demonstrated that the EU’s 
relation towards the actors involved within the particular levels of IBM differs to a 
large extent, leading towards varying modes of coordination. Hence, in the first 
level network and hierarchical as well as variant forms of coordination were 
present. While a rather clear network mode in the coordination and cooperation 
became visible regarding the USA and international organisations, the EU-
Russian relationship appeared to be a more attenuated strain of a network. 
Furthermore, strong hierarchical coordination was present in the EU’s relation 
towards the Western Balkans as candidate countries, whereas in the case of 
Turkey (candidate country) and the ENP countries, the findings indicated a more 
weakened hierarchy. Thus, while within level one a variety of coordination modes 
became visible, the operational cooperation with the associated Schengen 
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countries (level one) and the coordination of common European action between 
the MS (level three) were primarily characterized by a network mode.  
The second part of this study’s analysis discussed the vertical dimension of 
the EU’s border management with an emphasis on the level’s interconnection and 
coordination. Accordingly, it demonstrated that although all four levels are 
interlinked, the intensity of the interconnection varies. Thereby, interdependencies 
and relations of the actors are essential for the degree of interconnection. 
Consequently, it is arguable that the more mutual interests the stakeholders share, 
the more interconnected are these levels and the more likely is the appearance of a 
network between the respective levels. This was in particular shown by the close 
interlinkage of level two and three, whereas level one appeared to be a bit outside 
of the strong connection between the EU’s common action and the associated 
Schengen countries. Accordingly, the interconnection between the last three levels 
is characterized by a network in coordination, whereas the mode of coordination 
between level one and three differs depending on the respective stakeholder in the 
first level. Based on the distinction between formal strategic and operational 
coordination as well as on the findings regarding the other levels’ interconnection 
with level one, it is arguable that the more practical the cooperation’s nature, the 
more likely is a network mode of coordination.  
Referring back to the initial definition of coordination by Malone and 
Crowston (1990: 361) as “the act of managing interdependencies”, in all cases and 
levels interdependencies of the stakeholders became visible. Interdependencies are 
necessary as both sides need incentives to cooperate. Thereby, it appeared to be of 
importance whether the interdependency was asymmetric or symmetric. The 
thesis showed that the more symmetric the dependency, the more likely is a 
network mode of coordination. In this context, reviewing the particular EU-
stakeholder relationships and the EU’s internal coordination, it is noticeable that a 
hierarchical coordination mode is more likely to appear when conditionality and 
an asymmetric dependence are present. Hence, the stronger the EU’s political 
leverage, the more effective is the conditionality and the more probable is the 
presence of a hierarchy in terms of coordination
50
.  
Furthermore, the presence of trust and equality are significant factors for 
networks in coordination. Level two and three demonstrated these notions, 
intensified through diffuse reciprocities, whereas in the cases of hierarchical 
coordination in level one a top-down structure with specific reciprocity (related to 
conditionality) was identified.  
Nonetheless, in the end the combination and intensity of the factors and 
criteria mattered resulting sometimes in variant and attenuated forms of 
coordination. 
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 This was especially underlined in the case of the Western Balkans as candidate countries in 
comparison to the ENP countries. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The abolishment of the EU MS’ internal borders with the purpose of 
creating an area of free movements inevitably led to the need for effective 
European border management. Thereby the protection of the henceforth common 
frontiers became a community interest. Nonetheless, the findings of this study 
approved Berg and Ehin’s (2006: 55) characterization of the EU’s border policy 
as a “composite policy”. This fragmentation in turn also affects the coordination 
of European border management.    
The thesis’ first objective was to investigate the different efforts undertaken 
by the EU to manage the European external borders. Hence, considering the 
variety of stakeholders and measures, this study aimed at merely giving an 
overview by covering the most important aspects of the EU’s border management 
within the three examined levels. These endeavours included different 
surveillance techniques, common databases, joint missions and agencies as well as 
agreements of cooperation and funding by the EU. Thereby, the efforts to control 
the European external borders appeared to be of rather similar nature in level two 
and three, compared to the measures and policies of the EU towards and in 
cooperation with the third actors in level one.   
Turning to the research question’s second interest, namely the coordination 
of the EU’s efforts in border management, this thesis’ investigation was divided 
into a horizontal and a vertical dimension. Summarizing, in both dimensions it is 
arguable that the EU’s border management is neither a clear network nor 
hierarchy, but differs according to the four levels. The thesis demonstrated and 
confirmed that the mode of coordination depends on the respective stakeholders 
involved and the EU’s relationship towards these actors. As these relations are 
dynamic, the respective form of coordination varies and can therefore also expose 
variations within one particular mode. Thereby, the impression arose that 
operational cooperation in IBM is more often determined by a network mode of 
cooperation than strategic or formal legislative coordination. 
Moreover, notwithstanding that the analysis of the vertical dimension 
exposed the importance and presence of the European institutions in all levels of 
border management, the role of the Commission and Frontex as linking-pin 
organizations was noticeable. However, it appeared difficult to further pinpoint 
one actor that is responsible for coordinating both formal and operational matters 
of all levels. Although level three can be regarded the centre of European IBM, 
the interconnection to the three other levels is nonetheless of great significance 
since the involvement of the associate countries and third countries is essential for 
border management to be effective. 
In order to assess the study thoroughly, the influence of the EU MS cannot 
be denied as “within the legislative and political framework, the territorial 
authority and responsibility for border management remains with the member 
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states” (Council 2006: 11). Furthermore, although Frontex is able to act relatively 
autonomous it is still governed by a Managing Board composed of officials from 
the participating countries. Additionally, the direction and measures of border 
management in all levels are determined by intergovernmental institutions, 
namely the European Council and the Council. In this respect, referring back to 
Hooghe and Marks (2001: 1-4) who argue that multilevel governance means a 
loss of control for national governments, the impression arises that this is less 
intensively the case in European border management. Nevertheless, it may be 
considered that the EP can influence developments of IBM through the ordinary 
legislative procedure.  
Finally, it appears essential to evaluate the limits of this study. First of all, 
this thesis only took the efforts of IBM undertaken by the EU directly into 
consideration. However, the EU also conducts policies that are only rather 
indirectly connected to border security like prevention of crime and irregular 
migration in other non-contiguous third countries through development aid or 
peace missions. Considering the multitude of European efforts, this thesis merely 
gave an overview over measures and policies conducted at the three examined 
levels to lay the foundation for further studies. Furthermore, as this study 
concentrated on common European efforts, the fourth level of the model was 
omitted. Thus, future research should also consider bilateral actions and measures 
undertaken rather independently by the MS as well as the possible influence of 
further stakeholders such as civil society, NGOs or private actors.  
In conclusion, although the final responsibility for border control remains 
with the MS, the EU still has a far-reaching influence. This thesis showed that the 
four levels of border management are closely interconnected through the 
respective actors. Nevertheless, while researching some shortcomings also 
became visible such as overlaps of activities, a constantly changing institutional 
framework or the high politics character of border control that often impedes to 
reach an agreement. Notwithstanding these issues, there is a noticeable trend of 
Europeanization and centralisation of IBM coordination which was inconceivable 
two decades ago. In order to maintain the internal security of the area of free 
movements, one of the EU’s major achievements, a common and cooperative 
European IBM policy is inevitable. Thereby, the inclusion of the associated 
Schengen countries and third actors, in particular the EU’s neighborhood, is 
essential.  
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Appendix 4. The Modes of Coordination in the EU’s Border Management 
 
 
 
(own figure) 
Level Mode of Coordination
No geographical 
connection
USA Network
Russia (Strategic partner) Attenuated network
Western Balkans (Candidate country) Hierarchy
Turkey (Candidate country) Attenuated hierarchy
ENP countries Attenuated hierarchy
International 
Organisation
UN, IOM and Interpol Network
2
Operational Coordination: Network                               
Formal Coordination: Attenuated Network
3
Coordination MS: Network                                          
Coordination bodies/institutions: Attenuated hierarchy
1 Neighbouring 
countries
Case
Associated Schengen Countries
Frontex, COSI, WGs, European Institutions
